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THE

OBJECTIVITY OF TRUTH.

THE

OBJECTIVITY OF TRUTH.

BY

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"Abstract notions can do nothing."—*Bishop Butler.*

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PREFACE.

THE greater part of this Essay was written in Germany in 1883, at the close of my second year of study as Hibbert Travelling Scholar. The theory advocated in it, however, had occurred to me in its main outlines several years previously upon first becoming acquainted with Hegelian thought through Dr. Hutchison Stirling's celebrated work, "The Secret of Hegel."

The earlier portion of the Essay is principally historical, and relates to the conditions under which the problem arose, the solution of which is here attempted. That problem is the combination of the two schools whose development marks the progress of modern Philosophy. To this end it was necessary to point out that the Kantian and Scottish philosophies offer only inadequate, partial, and respectively one-sided solutions of the difficulties such a combination involves. The following pages are an attempt to enunciate a principle that may re-unite the divergent streams of speculation which flowed from Kant and Reid.

The last two chapters deal with the application of this principle to scientific and religious truth. The former, however, aims rather at illustrating the principle itself than at applying it to determine anything regarding the

ultimate laws or general method of scientific procedure. The latter attempts to sketch the outlines of scientific Theology. In doing so it seeks to show in opposition to the school represented in Germany in the present day by Biedermann, Pfleiderer, and Hartmann, that the Personality of God must be accepted, not merely as an accommodation to the needs of religious feeling, but as necessary on strictly philosophic grounds.

The discussion of the principle of the Objectivity of Truth, which forms the subject of the Essay, has been of necessity limited in its range. Its complete proof could only be accomplished by an exposition of the three sciences—Dialectics, Metaphysics, and Theology—which constitute the sub-divisions of Philosophy. The principle itself simply tries to develop all that is meant by "creative thought," and to give full scope to the realistic element latent in that conception.

DUBLIN, *March*, 1884.

ERRATA.

Page 5, lines 6 and 7, *for* "cognitious" *read* "cognitions."

„ 80, line 2, *for* "principal" *read* "principle."

„ 104, line 2, *for* "contitioned" *read* "conditioned."

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THE OBJECTIVITY OF TRUTH.

CHAPTER I.

THE EMPIRICAL AND DOGMATIC SCHOOLS.

THE material world is the world of external objects which we see before us. Mind is the thinking subject which perceives, and feels, and thinks these objects. The relation between these two terms is capable of being considered in a *twofold* aspect. We may inquire into the nature of the relation *as one of knowledge*, and ask by what process the mind comes to know this world of external objects. Or passing over the question as to the nature of this process of knowledge, we may inquire what is the actual nature of mind and matter as existent, and what is the actual nature of the relation between them considered as existent. It is obvious the two inquiries are intimately related to each other. The explanation of the nature of the process of knowledge, will involve a theory as to the nature and mutual relations of the objects between which the process takes place; and on the other hand, any theory of the nature and relation of the objects will have, not only to consider the knowledge of the one by the other as part of that nature and relation, but also to show that a knowledge capable of

knowing that nature and relation can then exist. The two inquiries differ rather in regard of the ends which they have in view, than of the problems which they involve. The one subordinates the question of the actual nature and relation of mind and matter, to its end of describing the knowing process; the other considers the knowing process, partly, as a detail in the account which it gives of the nature of mind and matter, and of their relation in actual existence, partly, as a preliminary condition and subordinate to the end of giving such an account. Both inquiries, too, are subjected to very similar conditions in regard of the answers to be given. The description of the process of knowledge must assume nothing in explanation of that process, of which the process as so explained cannot afterwards render an account; or as this may be otherwise expressed, it must represent the process of knowledge as such, that it is capable of affording a knowledge of the objects by which it is explained. The analysis of mind and matter, considered as in actual existence, must represent their nature and relations, in such a way, that the knowledge of the one by the other, of this nature and these relations, is compatible therewith, and indeed follows therefrom. The two inquiries are distinguished chiefly by this, that the one has the interest of our knowledge of the nature of *knowing* at heart, and considers being merely relatively thereto, the other has the interest of our knowledge of the nature of *being* at heart, and considers knowing only in order that it may be shown to be capable of affording this knowledge of being. To the one inquiry belongs the problem of modern Psychology, to the other belongs the problem of modern Ontology. The first was the problem of the Empirical school of modern philosophy with

whom the psychological interest was uppermost. The second was the problem of the Dogmatic or Rationalistic school with whom the interest of ontology predominated. In each case, the character of the beginning, the course of the development, the method followed, and the results to which it ultimately led, were determined by the specific nature of the problem to be dealt with, or the relative interest in which the questions common to both inquiries were discussed.

The first great representative of the psychological school in modern philosophy was Locke. In him we find the psychological interest foremost. He desires to give an account of the knowing process, and any inquiry into the nature of matter or mind, and into the relation between the two, considered as in actual existence, is by him, in the very beginning, expressly set aside (*Essay*, B. I., chap. i., sec. 2). And to this attitude he so far adheres that he never enters upon such inquiry for its own sake. It is, however, impossible to treat of the process of knowing, without also considering the objects known by it, and the causes to which its existence is due. To tell what these causes are, to assign the sources of our ideas, is to give a theory of knowledge. It is obvious, too, that these causes must, themselves, be the objects of the knowing of which they are the cause. Otherwise we have a theory of knowledge, which would render the knowledge involved in the theory and, therefore, the theory itself impossible. And this is what Locke implicitly asserts. To him an idea of sensation is the cognition of a quality in bodies which causes it, and, in the case of the primary qualities, the cognition of the resemblance of the idea to the quality. The idea is thus the cognition through that resemblance

of the quality in itself. Now, however true may be the position which Locke here assumes, the problem which it involves is a highly complex one, and it cannot be said that he has attempted the explanation of it. And it is evident why he has not, for the full explanation requires the confluence of the two lines of thought already referred to. But Locke is occupied merely with giving an account of the knowing process, describing the way in which we come by that knowledge of things which we have. He does not examine what the knowledge is, which the process has given us; what insight into the nature of things, of matter and mind, has been thereby revealed. The deeper problems as to what we know or may know in this respect he will set aside; or if he refers to them, it is with the hope of showing that our faculties are not fitted to deal with them; that the process of knowing of which he is giving an account is incompetent to decide them. But the common general knowledge of the world of objects he does assume; and it is with facts taken from that knowledge that he seeks to explain how the knowledge itself arose. Upon this basis, and employing the world of objects, outward and inward, as their causal source, he gives a history of the origin of the various ideas which people the human mind. Having done this, he was content. That this history was the true one, he appealed to everyone's experience. Had, however, Locke the second problem before his mind, which deals primarily with the objects of knowledge, and only secondarily with the process of knowing itself, whether as preliminary demonstration or *ex post facto* proof of the possibility of the knowledge implied, instead of dealing primarily with the phenomenon of the knowing process, and referring to objects only secondarily as the causes

which produce that phenomenon or the series of ideas which represent it, he would have been compelled to consider not the process, as it is a series of events, and an object of observation in the self-conscious experience of the individual, but rather what the inner nature of those events must be in order to be *cognitious*, and cognitious of something else than themselves. He would have considered experience, not as it is a *known* process, but as it is a process of *knowing*. As it is, Locke dealing with ideas and the processes of knowledge as they are *cognized*, rather than, as themselves, cognitive states of mind, the only cognitive character left them seems to be that which is involved in the consciousness of themselves. From these ideas, and the ideas of their relations, which the operations of thought produce, a system of knowledge of some sort may still be possible, but how this system of knowledge can be one with, or relate to, the world of real things which produce it, it seems difficult to imagine. And yet, if this knowledge is not the knowledge of that world, there is none other, according to Locke, which can give it.

This difficulty is one which belongs to Locke's theory of knowledge, when contemplated, so to speak, from the inside. But there is another difficulty inhering in it, when we consider the process of knowledge or the series of ideas, as regards the manner of its production. Locke, assuming the knowledge of the world of external objects, employs those objects to account for the production of that series of ideas, of which, as they appear in the mind, and present themselves in our conscious experience, his philosophy is the history. Objects, according to him, produce impressions on the senses which, being continued to the brain, there produce in

our minds the ideas we have of them. But between the material process, and the mental phenomenon, all link of connection is wanting. A chain is no stronger than its weakest part. And if an impression cannot be in consciousness, but only an idea, what the latter may be an effect of, is left undetermined. Its appearance in the mind is inexplicable, or explicable only through supernatural agency.

Out of these difficulties it seemed possible to escape, by modifying the Lockian philosophy, respectively, in either of two directions. On the one hand, it was possible to modify his conception of the world of objects, so as to suit his conception of the process of knowledge. If the world can only be known through ideas, and ideas can only know themselves, it was still, perhaps, possible to show that the world is such, that the knowledge of it, is one with the knowledge of the ideas. In a word, it was possible for a new system of philosophy, retaining intact Locke's theory of knowledge, as the history of the appearance of the ideas in the conscious experience of the individual, to bring to a clearer consciousness what must be the nature of the world in itself, the perception of which is supposed to be explained by the history of what subsequent philosophy distinguished as consciousness or self-consciousness. On the other hand, with regard to the second difficulty with which the Lockian philosophy was beset, it was possible to modify his conception of the nature of the process of knowledge, or rather of the subject in which that process resides, so as better to agree with the nature of the world of objects by which it is produced and Locke's account of the manner of its production.

The first of these methods of treating the philosophy

of Locke is that of Idealism and its great exponent Berkeley. The second is the system of Materialism. Both are equally legitimate developments of the Lockian philosophy, because the new ontology which each introduces, the idealistic nature of the world in the one case, the materialistic nature of mind in the other, is like the ontology of Locke himself (who if his attitude wavered on occasions, in the long run remained by the ordinary separation of spirit and matter) only introduced in aid of the explanation of the main problem, the problem of empirical psychology, to give the history of consciousness, to give an account of the process of knowing. But Locke's account of that process, which describes rather *our experience* of knowing than how knowing itself *is*, is neither in the one case nor the other really changed. The two great sources of our ideas, Sensation and Reflection, recognized by Locke, may appear to lose that distinctness of nature which reference to two diverse substances may give them, but the change is more apparent than real, so far at least as the knowing process is concerned. The oneness or the duality of the source of the ideas, in no way affects the history of their appearance in consciousness, and to give the history of that appearance, is, for Locke and his successors, to tell how we come by our knowledge.

It is possible to conceive idealism and materialism in English philosophy having a different origin to that which has been here assigned to them. It is possible to conceive idealism being introduced, not as a deduction from a theory of knowledge which rested upon an account of the events of our conscious life, but as a preliminary step towards facilitating the explanation of the action of the world upon mind, by reducing its essence to somewhat

spiritual, and its action on mind to an intellectual relation. In like manner it is possible to conceive the materialistic theory being proposed in the interest of our knowledge of a material world. It is obviously much easier to explain the knowledge of that world, if that through which it is known is considered as of like nature with the world, and consequently capable of representing in its relation to itself, its own relations to the world without. Such a view, however, whether with regard to idealism or materialism, would not only be inconsistent with historic fact, but would be untrue to the course of the development of English thought. The English psychological school started with a theory of knowledge which, as the history of the conscious experience of the individual, rested on the basis of internal observation. What is the world which is known in such a series of phenomena? what must the mind be in which such a series of impressions can be produced by a material world? were the problems with which it had to deal. In the process of knowledge the great gulf which apparently lies between the subjective and the objective is bridged. How is that bridge possible as cognitive process? asked Idealism. How is that bridge possible as process productive of cognition? was the problem of Materialism. The answer in both cases was at once the same and different. The same, in that both denied the alleged gulf really to exist *as a gulf between mind and matter;* different, in that each claimed to find it existing within its own territory, within that of mind in the one case, within that of matter in the other. Locke had resolved all knowledge into sensation and reflection. But sensation dealing solely with the material, can discover only the link between matter and matter, and reflection dealing solely with the spiritual,

can discover only the link between idea and idea. And since no third faculty existed which could discern the link between the material and spiritual themselves, it only remained to subordinate one to the other. Hence according to materialism, spirit is only matter which thinks, and according to idealism, the world is but the ideas contemplated in accordance with the laws of their occurrence and recurrence. But the ontology thus introduced, the spiritualization of the world in the one case, the materialization of mind in the other, is only introduced as a deduction from, because discerned to be a condition of the truth of an account of the process of knowing, which rests upon an independent basis of experience and inward observation. Idealism in England had always before its view the problem of the perception of a *world* by mind, and not that of the action of the world upon mind. Materialism always had the difficulty before it, how the world could act upon mind to the production of the consciously recognized process of knowledge, but was unmoved by the idealistic problem of the possibility of knowing the world by that process.

From the defects and one-sidedness in each of these opposite modes of contemplating the Lockian philosophy sprang the Scepticism of Hume. If Locke's philosophy was to maintain its ground, it was necessary that the causes of knowledge should be themselves objects of the knowledge of which they were the cause, and conversely, that the objects of knowledge should be the causes of the knowledge of which they were the object. But Idealism had shown that the only objects of knowledge were ideas, the mere phenomena of consciousness, and these tell nothing whatever of their cause. Hence we know nothing of matter or a material world which

may cause these ideas. We are conscious only of the succession of impressions themselves. But the materialists being thus disposed of by Berkeley, it only remained for Hume to point out in the idealistic doctrine the necessary absence of this causal relation, it only remained to show, that the objects of knowledge, could not be distinguished as causes of the knowledge, of which they were the objects, in order to convert Idealism into Scepticism. The nerve of Hume's Scepticism resides in his theory of Causation.

When we review the course of thought in the English Empirical School from Locke to Hume, we find that the sceptical results to which it led were a necessary consequence of its one-sided apprehension of the problem of knowledge. The end which it had in view was, to account for, or tell how we come by our knowledge. But in order to do this, it did not consider knowing as cognitive from out of itself of an object distinct from itself, but rather as the object of a second knowing, of a reflection or turning back of the mind upon itself. The mind, therefore, not being considered as in any further relation to objects, than as these might be the *unknown* and, as became quickly evident, the *unknowable* causes of certain states of itself, all knowledge necessarily appeared lost in these states. The knowing or the series of impressions and ideas displaces the objects of which it is the knowing, and becomes itself at once the knowing and the sole thing known, or rather it ceases to be *knowing*. It is of no use to characterize these states as states of matter, for the *raison d'être* of materialism, the possibility of explaining their origin through the mechanical action of material objects, is precluded by our necessary ignorance of any such objects, and moreover the only meaning of the word

mind is the series of these states. Nor yet does it signify to characterize them as states of mind or as immaterial, for material objects are nothing distinct from these, nor do these states stand in causal connection with anything different from themselves. The process of knowing only knowing itself and being nothing but itself, thus stands in its own light, and must really be incapable of knowing the objects which it appears to know; therefore the process of apparently knowing objects is, in truth, the process of being really ignorant of them.

If the Psychological School began with common sense —Locke—and ended with scepticism—Hume—it may be said that the Rationalistic School followed the reverse course, and beginning with the Cartesian doubt, ended with the formalism of Wolff. But in this latter line of thinkers the problem of philosophy is differently conceived. Here Ontology, the nature of what we know, and not the history of the process by which we know it, claims the chief attention. If the ontology of the Empirical School was partly in the interest of, and partly the consequence of, their psychological theory of knowing, in the Rationalistic School the relation is reversed, and their theory of knowledge is reached, partly as a consequence of their ontology, partly is adopted in the interest of this ontology in order to justify the knowledge assumed in it. Descartes, it is true, begins with a psychological question as to the reality of our knowing. In the famous Cartesian doubt, he questions the possibility of knowledge for man. But this doubt already rests upon, and implies an ontological principle. It implies the separation of thought from its object, the diversity in themselves of matter and mind. But the synthesis of these is the condition of knowledge. It

lies in the nature of knowledge to imply the truth of that which we clearly and distinctly conceive, if we can only make sure that we are not deceived by it. And here Descartes finds in knowledge itself apart from its content, in the thinking which it is, a fixed point of certitude. "Cogito ergo sum." Moreover, not only is the certainty of his own existence contained in it, but there are also certain ideas involved therein, independent of sensuous existence, and more particularly the idea of a God, to whom he owes his existence, and who is possessed of certain attributes of perfection, amongst others he is incapable of deceiving. Here at last is the assurance required. Our faculties may be trusted, and the knowledge obtained through them may be employed to explain the nature of the objects to which they are related.

Following the footsteps of Descartes, his successors proceeded to determine more particularly the nature of matter and mind, and the nature of the relation between the two. They found that these substances were so diverse in their nature, that it was impossible for the one to act upon the other. They conceived them clearly and distinctly as diametrically different, and the relation of knowledge became therefore impossible. The real things cannot be within the mind, nor can they impress an immaterial substance. From these difficulties sprang the doctrine of Occasionalism, and also that of Vision in God. Between these theories and the Berkeleian idealism, there exists an illusive resemblance. They differ from Berkeleianism, however, both in origin and content. Berkeley contemplated primarily the process of knowing, and deduced therefrom the idealistic nature of the world. Here on the other hand, the nature of mind and the world are primarily contemplated, and from their antithesis

the idealistic nature of knowledge is inferred. Destroy this antithesis, and the *raison d'être* of the theory is withdrawn. Malebranche's philosophy was thus determined by the motive of explaining what aid (*e.g.* innate ideas in Descartes, occasional causes and divine assistance in others, vision in God in Malebranche himself) our knowledge must derive from elsewhere, or from its own non-sensuous constitution, in order to account for the knowledge we actually possess of mind and matter, which knowledge represents them as actually such, that without some intrinsic or extrinsic aid, their natural and actual relations would make knowledge impossible. But the knowledge being once from whatever source obtained, it lies in its nature as *knowledge*, to have something to know, to implicate something out from and distinct from itself. And hence the difference in content between Malebranche's and Berkeley's doctrine. The former holds that the material world exists in itself apart from our perceptions. This Berkeley denies.

We have now reached a point where we can clearly formulate the historical conditions under which the problem of the Objectivity of Truth arose. The problem which Locke left to his successors was to discover objectivity for knowledge. The problem which Descartes transmitted to those who followed him, was to discover knowledge for objectivity. Both these problems however, taken in their entire compass, constitute the problem of the objectivity of truth. And just as Berkeley and Hume attempted to solve the difficulty involved in the first, by identifying the object with the knowing process, the series of ideas itself, so did Spinoza attempt the solution of the second by conceiving knowledge—thought—as of the essence of the object. Hitherto knowing and

its contents or mind, and being and its contents or matter, have stood apart from each other. The fundamental thought of Spinoza is the identity of being and knowing, of thought and extension, in regard to their content. A mode of extension, and the idea of that mode, are one and the same thing but expressed in two different ways. "Sic etiam modus extensionis et idea illius modi una eademque est res; sed duobus modis expressa; quod quidam Hebræorum quasi per nebulam vidisse videntur qui scilicet statuunt, Deum, Dei intellectum, resque ab ipso intellectas unum et idem esse." (*Eth.* II. 7, Schol.) "The perplexing," says Hegel, "in understanding Spinoza's system is on the one side the absolute identity of thought and being; on the other, their absolute indifference towards one another, since each explicates the entire essence of God." Thought and extension thus remain distinct in themselves, but the world revealed in the one is identical with that of the other. The problem of the Objectivity of Truth concerns itself precisely with the *nature* of this *identity*. If the world of extended objects is known in thought, it follows that thought must be in and constitutive of the objects known by it. The essential question is, in what sense is thought constitutive of the object? Is it in determining the essence of the object in any way determined by it? It must be conceded to Spinoza in this respect, that he has avoided the fundamental vice of German philosophy since Kant, that of attaching too great weight to the subjective side in this relation. This he does by conceiving a substantial identity in the attributes; thought and extension are equated with each other in a third something—substance. But what is substance? The necessity of answering this question has led to the identification of his substance

with the attributes, and this view may be doubted, yet the logic of the system seems to necessitate it.* The attributes are at least perceived as constituting its essence, and what else can the substance be but their totality? Substance therefore ceases to be a third something through which the attributes are equated with each other, and becomes merely an expression for the *process* in which they enter into the relation of identity with each other. The "that" in which they are indentified is themselves. But this process and essential identity may be conceived after a twofold manner. The identity of thought and extension may be conceived as ideal or real. The identity of being and thought may mean, that an object is in identity with that as which I have consciously determined it in thought. Or it may mean, that thought is identical with part of a material object. The former is an idealistic, the latter a materialistic identity. In the relation of these two kinds of identity to each other the process of the universe consists. God is ultimately identical or one with this process. That is the truth of Spinoza. But the complex unity and movement which pervades and unites all thoughts and things, is not to be understood through the dead unity of Spinoza's Substance. Philosophy must not only distinguish the ideal from the real identity, but also relate them to each other. Now it is possible to conceive the ideal as a mere phase of the real or materialistic identity,

* For an opposite view see Hegel (*Werke*, Bd. XV. s. 344) who regards the attributes as forms which the understanding applies to the absolute substance. In this he is followed by Schwegler. Kuno Fischer distinguishes the Attributes from the Substance. According to him the true relation of God to the world is that he is one and different as "Grund und Folge," or *natura naturans* and *natura naturata*.

and conversely, it is possible to conceive the real, as a mere phase or vanishing factor in the ideal identity. The former mode of conceiving the identity is that of rationalistic materialism; the latter is the system of Leibnitz and the Pre-established Harmony.

The fundamental conceptions of Leibnitz may be conceived as consequences and aspects of this ideal identity of being and knowing. The monad of Leibnitz has two sides. On the one hand, it is a being wholly shut in to itself, all whose qualities and changes spring from an internal principle. No external cause can influence the interior. Neither substance nor accident can enter a monad from without (Erdmann's *Leibnitz*, p. 705). The activity of the monad consists in perception or representation of that which is without. Every monad is a living mirror of the universe, endowed with an internal activity, by which it represents the universe according to its point of view (Id. 714). In other words, the monad is ideally identical with the universe. Here we have ideal identity or ideality, in complete independence of any real relation to things. But there is another side to the existence of the monads. The sum of the monads themselves compose the universe. This is the side of their real identity and plurality. The question is, how are we to conceive this side? They are not a plurality of existences in space; for to Leibnitz space is not a real being (Id. 752, &c.). The diversity of the monads must therefore have its ground in that receptivity and limitation, which is an essential condition of the existence of created beings (Id. 708). It remains therefore to see from whence this limitation arises. Now to explain the limitation or passivity of the monads, by a real action of the one upon the other, would be to break down the first prin-

ciples of the system, whose ultimate principle may be said to be the erection of ideal identity into the determining principle of the universe. It only remained, therefore, to explain the passivity of the monad as an ideal influence of the other monads upon it. And this is precisely what takes place in the doctrine of the pre-established Harmony, in that God in regulating each monad has regard to the others (Id. 709). This theory is thus the synthesis of the two sides of the monads' existence, but in such a way that the ideal side is really the beginning and the end, and the real side, as represented, is only an evanescent and phenomenal passivity.

In the philosophy of Leibnitz we encounter the germ of a theory more fully developed in subsequent philosophy, and which forms one of the chief errors with which the principle of the Objectivity of Truth has to contend. In a somewhat roundabout way Leibnitz makes thought its own presupposition. It is acutely presented by Mr. Caird. "If the monad is essentially a representative activity, and exists only in representing other monads, there can be no absolute division between its real and ideal sides. Each monad, as it exists, in representing and being represented by the others, acts and is acted upon by them. Each is in itself but a repetition of the same world from a different point of view; and there is no world but in these different representations. Each finds its reality in its ideality—its individuality in its relation to the whole universe" ("Philosophy of Kant," p. 77).

The philosophies of Leibnitz and Hume are the final outcome of the schools to which they respectively belong. With Kant and Reid we enter upon a new epoch. In Hume the process of thought has taken the place of the

object of thought; and it is because he cannot find in this process causation or substance, that he denies our knowledge of these relations, and reduces the principles in question to mere subjective aptitudes or tendencies. In Leibnitz, on the other hand, the process of thought has its object outside of it, is cognitive, and, therefore, in this sense, synthetic, *i.e.*, implicates, as a necessity of thought, its object. The more perfect creature contains that which serves to account *à priori* for what passes in another. But for this Leibnitz can give no grounds, except the postulate of a pre-established Harmony. He cannot explain why this implicative nature of thought has, and must have, in actual reality an object corresponding to it. The problem of Leibnitz is, grant that thought, in its nature, is *à priori*, to explain how this necessity or this implication can be anything more than a necessity, an implication *in thought;* how it can necessitate the existence of an object in reality and not merely the mere thought of such an object, or, rather, how the latter necessity shall possess a certainty and guarantee as to the former.

To Hume, who regards thought or ideas* not as cognitive but as objects of cognition, and indeed the sole objects, excluding from consciousness their causes (if any), by the very fact that they are effects, and who deduces all knowledge and principles of knowledge from these ideas and their association, a different problem presents itself. He has no thought-synthesis or implication which, in order to be true, postulates the reality of a real synthesis corresponding to it, of which it is the thought, but on the contrary, observing the sole objects of

* Ideas, in Locke's sense. The term is here used in Locke's sense, not Hume's, which is narrower.

cognition, his ideas, or rather impressions and ideas, in the absence of any *cognized* band between them except the contingent one of association, he denies the possibility of any *cognitive* principle, for such principle could only spring from the recognition of such a band. It is obvious that in both philosophers there is no real synthesis, for it is only when thought knows the objective truth of its own thought, it is only when it is the knowing of this on real rational grounds, existing in or cognized by the very thinking itself, that thought really becomes synthetic *as* thought, and can go on to add to the notion of thought—*the thought* of the object of that thought, which *thinking* addition of an object distinct from itself—is involved in the very nature of thought, and thought just consists in thinking the reason and the actuality of this addition. But if we asssume, as Leibnitz did, that the ground of the reality of this corresponding objectivity lies behind the thinking or knowing process itself, in God as ordaining the pre-established Harmony, and that the actual process of thought is not produced and determined by its object, and therefore is not through itself the perception of the objective reason and truth of itself as a thinking process, then we deprive thought of any rational synthetic movement. The movement of thought becomes no longer a *cognitive, cogitative* movement, but strikes round into its opposite, and ideas arise in the monad of Leibnitz, as Hegel remarks, like bubbles. "They are indifferent towards one another and also to the monad itself." Such a relation is the very reverse of what a thinking movement, a synthetic process of thought is. It is a truth which we shall require to accentuate hereafter in regard to Hegel, that the movement of thought, whether in

obedience to a force, or a dialectical law, can never be the source and legitimation of its own movement. Thought cannot move in obedience to, or accordance with, its own innate principle of movement, if this innate principle of movement is due merely to the moving nature of thought. Motion which is only through itself is rest. Only when it is shown, that thought as a whole as well as its essential principle, is correlated with, and is not without, that which is not mere thought, and whose movement and relations are not a mere rational relativity, can the movement of thought become and be recognized as legitimate.

In like manner, in Hume, there is no synthesis and therefore no cognition, for cognition is always the synthesis *in thought*, of thought with something which is not thought. But in Hume the process of cognition has no object distinct from itself, and therefore ceases to be *cognition*. Cognition implies that, that which it cognizes is prior to, and before, the process of cognition. If cognition has to wait for itself in order to exist, it must wait for ever. Thought, to know itself as determined by an object, must first consciously determine the object as object.

CHAPTER II.

IDEALISTIC AND REALISTIC OBJECTIVITY.

THE schools which at present divide between them the philosophical arena, are descended from two men—Reid and Kant. The first may be regarded as the founder of the Scottish Philosophy, the philosophy of Common Sense, or Natural Realism. In the earlier part of the present century, this philosophy received general recognition in this country and in France. Of late years, it has been overshadowed by the rival system of Kant. Between these two philosophies there exists an illusory appearance of resemblance, but in reality a radical difference. Both systems took their rise from the scepticism of Hume. Both agree in this, that the principles by which they would explain experience are *à priori* mental principles, which enable us to interpret the sequences and relations of phenomena. But the *à priori* of the one, is widely different from that of the other. The *à priori* mental principle of Kant is one by which the phenomena of experience are controlled and governed. It rules in phenomena *because* it rules in mind, and mind contains the system of the phenomenal world. Just the opposite is it with the Scottish Philosophy. Their *à priori* principle rules in mind, because it rules in things or phenomena, and mind discerns it as ruling there. The relative attitude of Reid and Kant towards the problem of knowledge, may be traced in

their respective relations to the schools which preceded them. The problem of the Rationalistic School was—granting that we *know*, that thought is *cognitive*, and cognitive of an object, what after all is the guarantee for the truth of cognition—that the object known really exists? how can thought certify the reality of its object? The answer was, that the object is intrinsically related to, and created by, thought. The problem of the Empirical School was, how can the affections, things produce in us, become knowledge? The interest of the first school was to prove *a truth of knowledge*, the interest of the second to prove a *knowledge of truth*. Leibnitz solved the first problem positively, by the doctrine of a pre-established Harmony, *i.e.*, by proclaiming a universal omniscience. Hume answered the second problem negatively, with the doctrine of Scepticism, *i.e.*, by proclaiming a universal nescience. It was then that Kant and Reid arose. Kant had chiefly the problem of Leibnitz before him, Reid the problem of Hume, *i.e.*, Kant wishes to provide an object for knowledge, to do which is necessary in order to show that knowledge is not illusive, while Reid wishes to provide a knowledge, a faculty of cognition, for the object, which is certainly necessary, if the belief in its existence is to be retained. The end which each of these philosophers has in view they seek to accomplish in a similar way, *i.e.*, by calling in the principle of the opposite philosophy to their aid. Kant, retaining substantially Leibnitz's principle of knowledge springing purely from thought or reason itself, thinks nevertheless he sees an escape from the supernaturalism and artificial harmonies of Leibnitz, by calling to his aid the subjective phenomenalism of English philosophy. For then, if the object be only the pheno-

mena of experience, may not my own individual thought determine, not merely my knowledge, but the object and its laws as well? Kant, in fact, tries to get rid of the need of Leibnitz's *Deus ex machina*, by setting thought an easier task, viz., the cognition of a phenomenal instead of a noumenal world.

Reid, on the other hand, sought to escape from the scepticism to which the psychological consideration of knowledge as an object of inner contemplation, of inward cognition, instead of as itself cognitive, had reduced English philosophy, by simply pointing out the general character of knowledge, of perception, that it is cognition out of itself, from its own nature, of an object distinct from itself. Reid distinguished carefully between the act of perception and the object of the act, and declared the former to be an immediate knowledge of the latter. He thus introduced the *cognitive* aspect of knowledge into English philosophy, and enunciated it as involved in the very nature of mind. The respective theories of Reid and Kant can be brought under a common formula with, however, a very different meaning in each case. According to both, knowledge implicates, projects, as it were, out from itself, the existence of its object. But in Reid the cognition of the object as external arises from the object actually being external, and whether this cognition be immediate or mediate, direct or indirect, his theory ultimately involves, that the cognition of the external is possible only through the actual externality to the cognition of that which is cognized by it. We shall have to return to this point afterwards. On the other hand, it is the very reverse theory which exists in Kant. With him, instead of the cognizing as external being possible only through the externality of that which is

cognized, the very reverse is the case, and the externality of that which is cognized exists or is, only through the cognition or possible cognition of it as external. This is involved in his whole theory of the phenomenalism of knowledge, that objects of sense exist only in experience. "By means of the external sense," he says, "a *property of our minds* we represent to ourselves objects as without us" (*Kritik der r. V. Trausc. Aesth. Abschn.*, I.). In the *Nachträge zu Kant's Kritik der reinen Vernnuft*, published by Erdmann, Kant remarks that the necessity of referring our propositions to something external, is a proof against Idealism of the actual connection in which we stand with external things. If we interpreted this statement in its obvious meaning, it would altogether destroy his whole philosophy and reduce it to the standpoint of Reid. It would bring the external sense, through which externality is, under the very condition of which it is the source. But there are, in fact, two explanations of which this statement of Kant's is susceptible. It may mean, that the necessary external reference proves the actual externality, because it is itself only possible upon the *pre*supposition of that prior actual externality, and this would be substantially the position of Reid; or it may mean, that the necessary external reference proves the actual externality, because the necessary external reference *necessarily creates that actual externality*, and this is the view which is consonant with Kant's whole philosophy, with his fundamental theory that objects of knowledge are to conform to our faculty of knowing them. Yet there are not wanting indications throughout the *Critique of Pure Reason*, that thought to Kant involved an externality, not spatial, of an object distinct from itself, which Kant calls "der Gegenstand

ueberhaupt." It is true, that merely so taken, it is not determined as a *possible* much less an *actual* object. But after all, it retains a logical possibility. There may be insuperable barriers to its possibility, but also there may not. But in any case this possible object, involved in the very nature of thought, is, even in this its pure logical possibility, always distinct from thought. When a sensuous manifold is given, and the pure unity of thought is specified in the various ways of combining this manifold called categories, these categories or rather the pure unity in them, still retain a reference to this object distinct from the thinking process, which object in this connection appears as transcendental object.* Or rather "der Gegenstand ueberhaupt" now becomes specified into two classes of objects, and receives a double, perhaps even a triple, signification. It becomes an actual object in phenomena—in objects of sense—and it also embraces under it noumena, supersensuous objects, which latter may be considered either absolutely in themselves, or in their reference to sense.† But this externality as a real

* Some doubt seems to have arisen on the subject of the applicability of the Kantian categories to noumena. Kant himself speaks of the thing in itself, as the cause of sensations. The Kantian doctrine appears to me to be that the categories apply only to phenomena, serve only to connect the manifold of sense, but that we may use them also, at least the dynamical, analogically to relate things *per se* to the manifold of sense, and that even in their purely phenomenal use, they always carry with them this reference to a transcendental object, as regulative principle. When however we entirely desert the conditions of sense, and would cognize things in themselves, then we know not whether such objects are cognizable by categories at all, or by such categories as ours, and are not rather objects of intellectual intuition.

† *Cf.* Schopenhauer, *Sämmtliche Werke* (Zweiter Band., s. 518, 526).

externality, vanishes completely in Fichte. Kant had postulated knowledge as coming ultimately from two separate sources—things in themselves, which produce sensations in us, and—the structure of the mind, by which sensations are elaborated into the world of experience. It was easy to show that a theory which thus conceives of knowledge as springing from diverse sources must quickly involve itself in contradictions, though there are not wanting in Kant abundant hints towards a far deeper correlation of these sources than was ever dreamed of by Fichte, Schelling, or Hegel. To Fichte, however, Kant's merit consisted wholly in the idealistic element in his philosophy. "This merit belongs entirely to the great man to have first of all consciously separated philosophy from external objects, and to have led it into ourselves" (*Fichte's Werke*, Bd. I., s. 479). The end towards which his own philosophical activity was directed he expresses thus: "My object is—to speak plainly—not the correction or completion of current philosophical notions, Kantian or anti-Kantian, but their total eradication, and the complete inversion of the mode of thought concerning these points of reflection, so that in real earnest and not merely in words the object will be posited and determined through the knowing faculty, and not the knowing faculty through the object" (*Werke*, I., s. 421).

Fichte's philosophy was certainly in one respect an advance upon the Kantian. According to Kant, the possibility of *à priori* synthetical knowledge can only be explained upon the assumption that objects must conform to our faculty of knowing them. We only know that *à priori* of objects, which we ourselves put into them, in the act of cognition. It is because we ourselves determine the object in the act of cognition, create to that

extent the object of our thought, that we can have assurance beforehand of the conformity of the object to our faculty of cognition. Kant's theory is based upon the principle that the possibility of the correspondence of subject and object, in which truth consists, is to be found within the subject. The subject is not only to be cognitive of the object but must produce, if not its existence, at least the conformity of its existence to the knowing faculty. But if the existence of the phenomenal object is itself dependent from an unknown thing in itself, the correspondence of the two activities, the external and the internal, is unexplained. Fichte is always triumphant wherever he is arguing against the thing in itself of dogmatism. Of those who refused to accept his own idealistic interpretation of Kant, he says "I would wish to put only a few questions to these expounders of Kant. How far does the applicability of the categories and in particular that of causality extend according to Kant? Only over the province of phenomena; consequently only over that which is already for and in ourselves. In what way then is it possible to arrive at a something different from the Ego, as ground of the empirical content of knowledge? Only through an inference from the grounded to the ground, therefore through application of the concept of causality. This is Kant's own view, and he therefore rejects the assumption of things in themselves present outside of us (an sich ausser uns befindlicher Dinge). But these expounders make him on this occasion forget the fundamental assertion of his system as to the validity of the categories generally, and make him arrive by a bold conclusion, out of the world of phenomena at the thing in itself outside of us. Aenesidemus, who understands Kant in the same

way, has clearly enough pointed out this inconsistency. Anesidemus' scepticism too, agrees with these Kantians in placing the truth of our knowledge in its agreement with things in themselves. What answer have they made him? Still, Kant speaks of a thing in itself. What is then this thing to him? A noumenon as we may read in various places in his writings. To Reinhold and Schulz it is the same, namely, a mere noumenon. But what is a noumenon? According to Kant, Reinhold and Schulz, something which is only thought on to the phenomenon by us, according to laws of thought which are to be proved, and by Kant have been proved, and according to these laws must be so added in thought; a thing consequently which arises only through our thinking; not however through our free, but through a thinking which under presupposition of the ego, is necessary, and which consequently exists only for our thinking, for us as thinking beings. And to what end will these expounders further use this noumenon or thing in itself? This thought of a thing in itself is grounded through sensation, and sensation is to be grounded through the thought of a thing in itself. Their globe rests on the great elephant, and the great elephant rests on the globe. Their thing in itself, which is a mere thought, is to act upon the Ego. Have they forgotten their previous language; and is their thing in itself which just now was a mere thought, now something other, than a mere thought? Or do they really wish to attribute to a mere thought the exclusive predicate of reality, viz., activity?" (*Werke*, Bd. I., s. 482, 483).

We have already pointed out in reference to this, that Kant's concept, even when taken quite generally, involves the notion of an object at least problematical, distinct

from itself. Only through such reference is the concept itself a concept. This problematical object it is, which becomes afterwards particularized as object of experience, and is identified with the transcendental object which is the cause of experience, with the thing in itself. Now Kant, partly in consequence of his subjective and individualistic standpoint, partly in consequence of what follows from that, his method of considering the faculties of mind as so much machinery towards producing and constituting the world of experience, instead of as factors in an already constituted whole, never brings together these two extremes—the pure thought, yet which ideally implicates something more than thought, from which experience receives order and form, and—the thing in itself, the external producing cause of experience. The consequence is, they strike round into one another. The thing in itself, abstract as we may from thought and try to sink into reality, remains in this very abstraction a thing of thought, and the category itself does the work of a thing. The root of the matter is this. Kant, like Hegel, although without being so fully aware of the nature of his procedure as the latter was, treats thoughts no longer as thoughts but as things. The relation of thought and thing is similar to the relation of knowing and known. A thought is the thought *of* something. Now when we treat the thought or concept *of* an object in general, or of a thing in itself, as the only real element in the matter, whereas we know nothing of that of which it is the thought; when again we conceive this concept to enter into conjunction with phenomena, and to prescribe laws to the latter, and to become itself specialized by means of the synthesis involved in these laws; when we conceive it as performing all this, quite independent of

the thing in itself, which it might be supposed to be the thought or concept of; when it can thus act on its own account, so to speak; it is obvious it is no longer a thought but a thing, and as much a thing as any *thing* we have knowledge of. The consequence is that when thought performs double duty, the thing thought of, becomes only an incumbrance and is quite superfluous. Later philosophy therefore quite consistently held, that the only real element in the latter was the thought of it. It follows, therefore, that, since the concept or category discharges in its own person the function of the thing of which it is the concept, the thing itself becomes unnecessary, is in fact in the way, and the Kantian category, in so far as it is the thought of a thing, is the thought of a thing which does not exist or at least cannot be known to exist, it is the concept of a problematical object, but the problematical nature of the object of thought matters very little to the thought of it, which, quite unconcerned, performs its own work and goes on its own way alone.

The task we have before us, is to bring together these two extremes, whose relativity to each other we have pointed out in the very heart of each. It was a necessary consequence of Kant's subjective standpoint, that even granting him the extremes, he could only bring them together mechanically. He could not understand how the thought in us could have a mysterious tie, penetrating through, and correlating it with, the thing in itself outside. But further, this very thing in itself, which is the condition of his subjective standpoint, is impossible under it. "While for a supposed external observer the existence of a non-Ego might furnish explanation of what presents itself in the consciousness of the subject —that is to say of the limitation of the subject—no

such explanation is possible for the subject himself. That he should *be* limited may possibly result from the existence of a non-Ego: that he should *know himself* as limited cannot be explained from the existence of the non-Ego simply" (Adamson's *Fichte,* p. 127). Fichte had therefore no hesitation in deciding, whether the subjective or objective side was to be surrendered, and the independence or correlation of the two sides was to him impossible. "Now the *representation* of the independence of the Ego and of the thing can certainly exist together, but not the *independence itself* of both. Only one can be the first, the beginning, the independent; the second is necessarily, in that it is the second, dependent from the first with which it is to be conjoined" (Fichte, *Werke,* Bd. I., s. 432).

For the standpoint of subjective Idealism such a correlation was impossible. So long as the object which is posited by thought, has all its reality retracted into the action of the thought by which it is posited, it is impossible for thought in us to have more than a subjective value. When however we conceive thought as independent of *our* thinking, it is no longer necessary to conceive it as the *prius* of the thing, but the thought of the thing may just be this, to think it as being itself in the very act of thinking determined by it.

Such a correlation however of thought and being, is not to be found in the objective idealism of Schelling. It is certainly a merit to have regarded Reason as objective, as in the world. His error consists in the way in which he regards Reason as existing in the world. Objective Intelligence in Schelling is not objective in the sense that, even as objective, it is distinguished from the object. He treads too closely in the footsteps of his

predecessor. From Kant to Hegel the method of contemplating thought as a thing, prevailed exclusively.* That is, thought or intelligence is considered not in the only relation in which it is really thought, viz., as the thought *of* a thing, as implying in its being the antithesis of subject and object. On the contrary, especial pains are taken to exclude this relation. "As the natural philosopher with his mind directed solely to the objective seeks to prevent nothing so much as intrusion of the subjective into his knowledge, so on the other hand the transcendental philosopher seeks to prevent nothing so much as intrusion of the objective into the purely subjective principle of knowledge" (Schelling's *Werke*, Bd. III., s. 343). The consequence is, that the two, subject and object, not being considered in their organic relations with each other, their identity is only abstract identity, and Schelling ends where Spinoza begins. In the preface to the *System of Transcendental Idealism*, Schelling claims to have presented philosophy as that which it is, viz., as advancing history of self-consciousness (fortgehende Geschichte des Selbtbewusstwyns), for which the deposits of experience serve as memorial and document (Denkmal und Document). We have here the relation of consciousness to its object radically misconceived. Self-consciousness can itself exist, can have inner determination, can have a "fortgehende Geschichte," not simply through experience, as merely affording a "Denkmal und Document" (which therefore presupposes, and has significance only, through the presupposed onward

* This is sometimes considered the exclusive privilege of English philosophy. In truth it always happens whenever the attempt is made to consider thought in itself out of relation to its cognitive reference to the object.

movement of self-consciousness), but through experience as embodying an objective correlative, through which self-consciousness is, and is the system which it is. "The necessary tendency," says Schelling, "of all natural science is to pass from nature to the intelligent. This, and nothing else, lies at the basis of the endeavour to bring theory into the phenomena of nature. The highest perfection of natural science would be the complete spiritualization of all laws of nature into laws of intuition and thought. The phenomena (the material) must completely disappear, and only the laws (the formal) remain. Hence it comes that the more in nature itself the accordance with law breaks forth, the more does the veil disappear, the phenomena themselves become more spiritual, and at last fully cease" (Schelling's *Werke*, Bd. III., s. 341, 342). Here Schelling omits to see that the laws of intuition and thought are, in the process of knowledge itself, only through and in relation to the laws of objectivity. Nature does not merely produce intelligence as the invisible repetition of itself. It is also as the objective reciprocal, the very condition of intelligence being intelligence. Hence, so far from the phenomena, the material, becoming more spiritual, in the advance of knowledge, and at last completely ceasing, the system and laws of objectivity are never more fully involved and implied by the spiritual processes themselves.

The system of Hegel is at least the recognition of this fundamental error in Schelling's philosophy. Hegel recognizes that the movement of thought is not without the object, and also that the object through which the movement of thought is, is created by the movement itself. Nevertheless, he, even to a lesser degree than

Schelling, concedes to objectivity its full rights, and consequently he is unable to arrive at a correct understanding of thought and its movement. It is a merit in Hegel, that he has conceived thought as involving not merely identity but also difference. But then he conceives thought as itself giving birth to the difference through which thought is, as creating its own determinations. But thought can in its own person create nothing, not even itself. "Abstract notions," says Bishop Butler, "can do nothing." The fact that the real determination of thought by another, takes place in the intellectual process through the thinking determination of thought itself, has led Hegel into imagining that this latter determining essentially absorbs the entire process. He did not recognize that *within* this process itself the reference to determination by something which is not thought is contained, that the process itself is this reference, consequently that thinking is the bringing itself under the criterion of that which it thinks. That which it thinks may be as a *thought* the product of the thinking, but it the thinking does not think it as a thought but as a determining object, that is as a something which determines in actuality the possibility of the thinking process by which it is itself thought. In this way the movement of the thought, and that of the object, are separated, and yet exist only through each other. But such separation has not been effected by Hegel. On the contrary, he contemplates thought in the mechanical method inherited from his predecessors. He watches the dialectical play of the categories, as if they were the particles of some fluid, whose transitions and relations he was observing. They are taken up one by one, as if they were so many atoms of intelligence. But the considera-

tion of them as thoughts whose movement is rational, and is itself the very act of understanding its reason and causes; a system of Dialectics and Metaphysics which should unfold and explain the ideal-real web of the universe, exists not in Hegel.

We now return from the consideration of the methods of the Transcendental School to Reid. Reid's philosophy wears in many respects a superficial aspect. The appeal to Common Sense, inward principles, &c. is not one that commends itself. It seems only to emphasize what does not require any emphasis, viz., the certainty, the strength, the force of inward conviction, whereas it is not this subjective certainty or force which is called in question, but rather whether it is well grounded; not the fact of the vehemence of our belief, but the possibility of justifying the belief at all, whether vehement or not. Nevertheless there is more in the philosophy of Reid than lies upon the surface, and his system involves a method of justifying these inward beliefs or principles, which, however inadequate by itself, still contains essential elements of the truth, and is every whit as adequate as the principle which underlies Kant's deduction of the categories. Kant shows the necessity of the categories and the creative or rather the determinative power of thought, in order that there may be for us experience and objects of experience. Reid's principle ultimately involves, that thought has *such* a knowledge of objects that *that* which is known involves the truth of the knowledge of it, that the matter of knowledge involved contains in itself the assurance of the truth, the justification so to speak of the knowing process by which it is acquired. In other words, Reid really did what Kant claimed to have done, he retorted the game which Idealism plays

upon itself. Idealism said the external world exists only in the knowing, therefore it is not. Reid sees that if it is not, the knowing of it cannot be. For the rest, Reid contented himself with merely enunciating this principle, and pointing out that we distinguish our knowing of the object from the object that we know, without attempting any more minute analysis of the principle itself. He classed under the same head of immediate knowledge—memory, perception of distant objects, cognition of the primary qualities, &c. It was however necessary that his principle, the immediate knowledge by the mind from out of itself of its object, should undergo a closer analysis and more critical development. For that principle is susceptible of a twofold interpretation. We may understand this immediate knowledge to exist, because in it the object is actually present to the mind (which is not the case with past and distant objects), enters itself as a necessary factor into the present constitution and existence of the knowing state, so that without its presence that state itself would not exist; or we may hold that the immediate knowledge, while still remaining at least apparently an immediate knowledge by the mind from out of itself of the object, still does not require the actual presence of the object, at least as we appear to know it, at the present moment, and in immediate, existent, constitutive relation with the mind, although it may require, not for *the present existence and exercise* but for *the production* of this power of immediate knowledge as permanent faculty, the more or less frequent presence of the object in past time, whatever conclusion we may form as to the ultimate nature of the object which was then present, whether we analyze it into the Lockian conception of body with primary qualities and powers actually

residing in it, or ultimately resolve it into the permanent conditions of its own possibility. Both these theories represent elements and moments of the truth. Both also fulfil to a large extent the conditions which render the verification of a philosophical theory possible, and both are also ultimately by themselves inadequate.

The first theory is that of Hamilton, and possess certain advantages over the second. It is obvious that if I can prove, from the nature of that which I know, or appear to know, in a given state of consciousness, that this knowing or appearing to know is itself only possible through the actual existence, independent of the knowing state, of that which is known by it, then I have here a verification or justification of the knowing process in question as rigorous as Kant's deduction of the categories. The possibility of the act of knowledge may not be explained, but its legitimacy will be established. Just as Kant postulates certain functions in the constitution of our faculties and proves them, or decides the question (*Quid juris?* from their necessity, if experience and objects of experience are to exist for us, so here the reverse road is travelled, and, from the nature of that which is known, the knowing of it is seen to be impossible unless upon presupposition of the independent existence of the object known. The grand objection to this theory is, how can the conditions of the possibility of knowing be themselves known? If the knowledge of these conditions is derived from that which is known, since it is the truth of that which is known, which they are to verify by showing that its truth or reality is the necessary condition of the knowledge of it, this would only be to fall into a metaphysical dogmatism. It would, in Kantian language, be making a metaphysical assertion

without a transcendental deduction, *i.e.*, without showing how the mind could know universal conditions of possibility, or that that which it knows in a particular case is a condition of all possible knowledge. If, on the other hand, we derive these universal conditions of possibility and their knowledge (which constitute the major premiss for the inference, by which our knowing faculty is to be justified or verified), not from that which is known, but from the act of knowing, then we simply fall back upon the position of Kant, and invest the knowing faculty or, ultimately, thought, with the norm of its own truth and legitimacy. Thought, then, must become the ultimate bar before which thought itself shall be judged and criticised; and we are reduced, finally, to the self-criticising and self-developing thought of the Hegelian philosophy, where the criticism, just because thought does not *think* any object distinct from itself, in relation to, and by reference to which, its own thinking may be tested and judged (it is true by thought itself), ceases to be an intelligent thinking and becomes a mere mechanical process, the moving force of which is simply a ceaseless *petitio principii.*

The next objection to Hamilton's doctrine is, that even granting that it is capable of verification and proof in the manner we have suggested, that the knowing can be proved to be impossible, if that which is known does not actually exist in immediate present relation with it, nevertheless the relation between the two is inexplicable, is, as Hamilton himself admits, one of those ultimate facts which must be accepted but are, in one of his several uses of the word, inconceivable. Hamilton, in other words, does not, like the school which we are going to speak of next, regard the faculty of knowledge as produced by the

object but only as existent, at least, when in exercise, through the object as correlative factor, correlative, at least, when engaged in the knowing process. His doctrine thus presupposes a pre-established harmony, not indeed in the sense of Leibnitz, but in the sense that thought and the object which it immediately perceives are adapted to each other in regard to their relative faculties and capacities, though of what precise nature this relation of intellect to its object is, it would be difficult to say. The last objection to Hamilton's theory is, that the limits of its extent are undefined. In his works he wavers between—the distant object like Reid —the object at the point of sense, or—the nervous system itself and the brain. And again, there are a whole class of experiences which apparently refute it. In imagination we appear for the moment, and in dreams and illusions, we believe ourselves, to know an object which, nevertheless, is not actually present. Here we have *the mental state* of immediate knowledge without the actual object conditioning its existence as a correlative factor. Nevertheless we shall see hereafter that Hamilton's theory contains a highly important phase of the truth, that there is an element in knowledge, the act of knowing which, is itself possible only through the present independent existence of it as known.

We now come to the second theory, which has at least the advantage of staving off, if it does not get rid of, the sort of pre-established harmony we found in Hamilton's theory. It is possible, accepting Reid's theory of immediate knowledge as a faculty or power of thought, to consider that faculty or power as not dependent upon the existence of the object as entering into equal correlation with the knowing act in consciousness. It is possible to

hold, that what is really present is only a sensation or state of our own mind, and that when we, over and above this, possess an immediate perception of an object regarded as independent of us, this is solely due to the action of our own faculties, while these faculties capable of so acting have themselves been produced by the action of objects, in the experience either of the individual or the race. This theory is far more idealistic than the preceding. It is here admitted that into what constitutes the object for the developed consciousness, subjective elements largely enter. We cannot distinguish these intuitively, cannot therefore attempt to find in the objective element a criterion of the legitimacy of the subjective act. Nevertheless it is from the objective, from that which has been experienced, either by ourselves or the race, that we attempt to derive the subjective faculty. But the objective facts in the history of our experience and the growth of our faculties, are themselves the object of the faculty which has been developed from them. To understand therefore from what it is that our faculty has sprung, we must have some method of discerning the nature of that history *minus* the contributions of our present faculties.* It matters not here to what result this analysis may lead, whether it might show that the objective element comprises everything which the developed but uncritical faculty of a ploughman attributes to it, or should point to an analysis like Locke's, in which body and its primary qualities and powers *minus* the

* The difficulties in the way of a *merely* psychological or physiological explanation of the genesis of mind are powerfully put by Mr. Caird, *Philosophy of Kant*, pp. 374, 398, 399. These difficulties, however, do not therefore render physiological psychology less essential for explaining the constitution of mind.

sensations are the objective element, or whether again a certain system of laws or permanent conditions to which the order of sensations conforms is recognized as such, these laws or conditions themselves consisting in relations of simultaneity, sequence, resemblance, &c. What we have to do with here is the conditions upon which the verification of such a theory is possible. These conditions the theory to a large extent fulfils. To arrive at the objective element, *minus* the subjective additions of our faculties, does not seem an attempt *à priori* impossible. If it can be shown that the faculty or power which we now possess, although this may not be necessary to its present existence, could still only have been produced through the actual existence of that, or certain elements of that, which it now represents as the object, we have then a demonstration of the legitimacy of the cognitive process so far, at least, as this objective residuum is concerned. It may be remarked in the first place, however, that the opposition between the objective element and the subjective additions here made is misleading. The most important subjective addition is the recognition of the objective element itself as objective, in which the very faculty consists. For the objective element does not exist in our consciousness *as such*. It comes to light as that through which the faculty and its operations are possible. It is the knowledge or supposition that this is that through which my perception exists, which causes the element in question or any element to be perceived as objective. For if we hold that the object, or Permanent Possibility of Sensation, or whatever else our analysis leads to, is itself produced or arises with the act of knowledge, we approach an Idealism where the objective has vanished, in which mind generates and is not

generated.* In the next place, in order to infer from the existence of the cognitive faculties and their operations, the objective factor through the action of which those faculties and their operations have been produced, we must, as the basis of such an inference, have knowledge of, and consequently a faculty of knowing, certain permanent conditions of the production of such an effect, by which we may be enabled to say the effect in question could have originated from this cause and no other. But if these conditions are objective, we are compelled to admit in regard to them the theory of Hamilton, whereas, if subjective, we will be compelled with Kant to explain the origin of the conditions through mind, not mind through the conditions. The last objection to this theory is, that the objective element, be it the world of the ploughman or the world of permanent possibilities, has meaning only for mind and cannot explain the genesis of that which it presupposes. Nevertheless, admitting indeed, that thought is prior to the objects, and that it cognizes directly from out of itself permanent conditions of objectivity, viz., those of space, there is still a mental state—sensation—in regard to which the activity of thought consists simply in recognizing itself as passive, as produced and determined by an object.† The conditions of the possibility of this, we shall consider in the following chapters.

* Mr. Mill's admissions made in the note beginning on page 257, *Exam. of Hamilton*, do not leave him far from this standpoint.

† The elaborate and acute criticisms of Locke by the late Prof. Green in his *Introduction to Hume* may often be met by distinguishing a passivity in knowledge which is given to and through the very activity of thought itself.

CHAPTER III.

THE OBJECTIVITY OF TRUTH.

TRUTH has been defined as the agreement of thought or cognition with its object. It is possible to cavil at this definition, nevertheless its correctness depends upon the meaning which we attach to the terms. It depends upon what we mean by thought, what by the object, and what by the agreement which is said to exist between them whether the definition shall express truth or not. What it is which thus agrees with cognition, what the nature of the cognitive process or thinking activity with which it agrees is, in what this agreement consists, and by what means it is brought about, are the questions we have now to consider. In the foregoing chapter we have witnessed the development of thought in two distinct schools, each of which seeks to explain the agreement in question in its own way. The one school starting from the subjective side—from the side of thought—begins by making this side the basis upon which the agreement of thought with its object shall rest. Each of these phases can be brought into harmony with the other only if there exists a principle of unity between them. Kant is under no hesitation as to which side shall furnish this principle of unity. The most general laws of the objective world can be in agreement with the

fundamental principles which guide our intelligence in the investigation of that world, and in the interpretation of the phenomena of experience, only if the principles of intelligence themselves create the laws in question. If the data of sensation are to have significance for us, they can have it only in so far as they are interpreted by the laws of intelligence; and how can intelligence possess such a principle of interpretation, determine aught *à priori* in regard to experience, if it is not, because the objects of experience must conform to it, if it does not impose upon them the law according to which it proceeds in interpreting the objects? The necessity of *à priori* principles to the formation of experience, to raising the confused matter of sensation into a formed and intelligible universe, and the impossibility of showing the possibility or legitimacy of these principles if they are not considered not only as subjectively guiding the intelligence but also as objectively constitutive of phenomena, is the governing idea. To Kant the subjective guidance is possible only if the phenomenal constitutive validity be conceded. The difficulties of this standpoint were soon apparent. In the first place, the sensation, and the order of its occurrence, stand in no *à priori* relation to the principles of intelligence. In the second place, the thing in itself, by which it is supposed to be produced or given, is not an object of experience. It can only be inferred as the unknown cause, the unknown ground of phenomena, *i.e.*, it is the object of a category. But the only object of a category, according to Kant's own principle, is that where it realizes itself in experience, determines or forms its own object, and the object, as such, is, therefore, not the thing in itself. It is only the category's own activity concealed from itself. In fine, if

the thing in itself is, *i.e.*, is totally out of relation to intelligence, there cannot be the thought of it, and if there is the thought of it, the object of the thought cannot be the thing in itself. In the subsequent development of philosophy, we have seen the material objectivity of Kant vanish, though in his system already, all that gives to objectivity a formed and regulated context, and therefore renders it valuable for knowledge, comes from thought. But in Fichte's system, and still more in Schelling and Hegel, the relation of thought to its object is resolved more and more into a relation of thought, to itself. The nature of truth comes to be conceived as dependent upon a mechanical, dialectical development of thought, and it is in its relation to other thoughts, and not in its relation to an object distinct from itself, that the value and significance of a category is conceived to lie. The ultimate condemnation of this method is that it fails to solve the problem which it was designed to solve. The transcendental method proceeds from the necessity of *à priori* principles, in order to raise out of the elemental data of sensation a systematic experience. A principle of the interpretation of sensation, must exist *à priori* in the mind, for the construction of the *knowledge* of objects. The necessity of such a *principle of interpretation* is all which the transcendental method so far proves. And this we concede, but we also hope to show that the relation of thought to objectivity is such, that *à priori* principles of interpretation can exist without assuming that they enter into, determine, or really constitute the order of phenomena or the element of objectivity in things. Kant, however, could not see how such a principle of knowledge, of interpretation, could be possible, if this same principle existing in the mind

did not determine the objects of knowledge, did not so far enter constitutively into their formation. And the possibility of such a formative, constitutive, determinative activity, seemed to him to be clearly admissible, when the conclusions of the English psychological school as to the phenomenalism of knowledge were accepted. He conceived therefore that he was not only justified in arguing on the transcendental method to an *à priori* principle of knowledge or rule of interpretation, but was also justified in concluding that this principle entered as a constituent factor into objects, provided always, that the qualifying words are added *of possible experience.* But in making this latter inference, Kant really shut out for himself the possibility of his principle being a principle of *knowledge*, of interpretation, of cognitive apprehension of something distinct from itself. For what can such a principle *à priori* know? At the very most the future existence of itself in experience, if our mental constitution remains unchanged, itself as objective related to itself as subjective. If sensation be considered as an element not in itself related and totally determined by reference to these *à priori* principles, the latter cannot tell anything *à priori* concerning sensation, and yet to give *à priori* rules for the interpretation of sensation is Kant's object. Hence Fichte's rejection of sensation as a matter given independently to the subject, his reduction of *à priori* knowledge to the mode of relation of subject and object, the dialectical method, and the Fichtean deduction of the categories. In all this Fichte reduces the Kantian method to self-consistency, but at the same time empties it of its concrete content. But even if reduced to consistency, but also to a dry thread of barren dialectic, the transcendental method is neither in Fichte nor his successors rescued

from its inherent weakness. It never amounts to anything more than the necessity to thought to create its object since it, thought itself, is only through this object. Such a method proceeding on the principle of mutual co-reference, relativity, may furnish an excellent form for exhibiting the relations of things in the universe, and perhaps may even give these relations a systematic classification, it may bring into the clearest consciousness the fact of the universal relativity of things, assuming that such universal relativity does actually exist, but why just these relations exist, and how they come to exist it cannot explain. It may be correct in its enumeration and classification of them, but that it is so, for this the dialectical method can give no other guarantee, than the contingent necessity of its own procedure. But it cannot show from whence this necessity arises, it can offer no explanation of its own rythm. The movement and the principle of the movement are once for all there, but from whence they derive their vitality is unexplained. They are perhaps self-moving? Perhaps; but that only means they find themselves so. The dialectical method may at bottom be true or have a ground of truth, but whether it has or not, or how it has, that method cannot itself explain. It thus developes for the interpretation of experience a method of knowledge, which in its unexplained arbitrary evolution, is more empirical than experience itself. But whether certain conceptions are to be developed in mind through the action of association or even a materialistic necessity operating in ordinary experience, or through an equally mechanical law of relativity or evolution operating in the region of pure thought, or rather in the experience we have of ourselves and of the movement of pure thought in us when we

philosophize, is really indifferent. The essential error in Kant and his successors is this: the principles upon which thought proceeds, or the acts by which the object is intellectually determined, *i.e.*, made to exist and to be an object for thought, being themselves one with the object which exists through their means, cannot possess an interpretative cognitive character, but can only exhibit a barren mechanical dialectical movement.

The realistic school are equally unsuccessful in solving the problem of philosophy. Their method, whether we take that form of it which has been called Natural Realism, or follow the Association Psychology, consists essentially in showing, that thought is possible, that the faculty of thought can be or be produced, only through the objective reality of that which it thinks. Here the object furnishes the principle of unity through which the correspondence of thought with its object is to be explained. But here the difficulty arises that the object through which the constitution of the faculty of thought is explained, is precisely that which as an object of thought is itself constituted through the faculty of thought. Nor even starting from the object, can any reason be assigned why it should give birth to a product capable of resuming within itself the interpretation of its origin. The fact that that by which it explains the faculty of thought is itself in another aspect only the product of that faculty, is the rock upon which this theory is wrecked. It may be possible for intelligence to go out of, beyond itself, but to do so in order to explain the origin of itself is impossible.

Both schools of thought, the Transcendental and the Empirical, in their explanation of the nature of thought and its object, and of the relation which exists between

them, being thus equally false, it remains that we consider what that relation truly is. And here it must be conceded that although each theory taken by itself is one-sided and erroneous, yet each also represents a phase of the truth. We have only, therefore, to bring both together, to present them in the unity of one conception, of a single principle, in order to discover what the truth is. The fundamental principle of the Transcendental School is the creative power of thought. What is this creative power, and how is it exercised? It is unnecessary here to refer to the different forms in which this creative activity has been conceived. If we consider attentively what this creative power or force is, we shall see that it is itself the very object, the innermost kernel and nerve of that which, according to the opposite school, determines and is not determined, creates and is not created, by thought. Just that which thought is supposed to add to sensations by which it makes them determinations of an object, this object is that which, according to materialists and sensationalists, determines thought. Just that, therefore, in which, contemplating it from the one side, the activity of thought, of the Ego, seems to be most clearly demonstrated, is the very thing which, contemplating it from the other, seems to most clearly prove the absolute passivity of the Ego and of thought. By none has this been more clearly seen than by Fichte. The problem is, how can the Ego, how can thought be in apparently one and the same respect active and passive at once? Fichte solved the problem by the representation of the passivity as diminished activity, and the representation of the ideal ground and real ground as one. The principle which the further justification of this theory introduced, is the beginning of that mechanical circular method of reci-

procal reference, which ultimately found its purest and finest expression in Hegel. But we have already rejected this method and its results. It remains, therefore, to be seen whether there may not be another solution of the problem besides the Fichtean. The statement made above, that the creative determining action of thought is the very essence of the object, would not be rejected by a representative of the Transcendental School. But in making the statement, we had a different meaning in view. The creative power of thought is not one with thought itself. This creative power, this force, is itself the very object which thought thinks, which thought thinks *of*. In thinking this object, thought does not think simply itself. In so far as it thinks itself, it thinks itself *materialized*, and, so far, other than itself. It thinks that through which, in thinking it, thought is itself determined and passively determined. In other words, the problem which was stated above must not be solved in Fichte's manner through the notion of limitation. We must not assume that the passivity of thought is a diminished activity. On the contrary, its activity and self-activity remains undiminished. Its passivity and the determination of thought by the object exists in and through the very activity of thought. Thought posits the object as that through which thought itself is, and this its positing of the object is itself the very object which it posits, and through which it is. There is here an original synthesis of thought with objectivity. It lies in the very nature of thought to think an object, and through this its object thought itself is.

It will serve to place the point under consideration in a clearer light, if we recall a dictum which lies at the basis of much of German philosophy. It is, that thought

cannot transcend itself, that the intelligence cannot go out of and beyond itself to cognize an object which is not thought or not *mere* thought. To the school in question, such an object is itself a thought, and, in fact, a very empty thought. "In so far," says Hegel, "as subjective thought is our own innermost act, and the objective notion (Begriff) of the things constitutes the thing (Sache) itself, we cannot transcend that act, we cannot stand over it, and just as little can we transcend the nature of the things. From the latter determination, however, we can abstract. It coincides with the former in so far as it would give a relation of our thoughts to the thing, but only something empty (etwas Leeres), because the thing would be therewith set up as rule for our notions, but the thing can be for us nothing else than our notions of it. When the Critical philosophy so understands the relation of these three terms, that we place the thoughts between us and between the things as middle in the sense that this middle rather shuts *us* off from the things, instead of shutting us together with them, to this view the simple remark is to be opposed, that just these things which are to stand at the other extreme beyond us, and beyond the thoughts which relate to them, are themselves things-of-thought (Gedankendinge), and as wholly undetermined only a thing-of-thought—the so-called thing in itself, of empty abstraction" (*Werke*, Bd. iii., s. 16, 17).

The critique of the Kantian philosophy, which the foregoing extract contains, hits correctly enough one of the chief errors in Kant. Hegel is, however, mistaken when he supposes that he himself is entirely free from the same error. The Kantian philosophy, if it excludes us from the things as things in themselves, introduced,

nevertheless, a way of contemplating thoughts as though they were themselves things, or at least part and parcel of all the things we know. The consequence was, that the real things had to give way in consciousness to a certain hybrid product of thoughts and sensation, and retire into the unknown region of the noumenal world. This mode, therefore, of conceiving the categories as revealing truth only when they themselves were *incorporated* with experience, very naturally led to the consequence, that, instead of affording us a knowledge of things, they become the means, as Hegel says, of excluding us from the things. Hegel's own philosophy, however, is a logical development of the Kantian, and of precisely this side of the Kantian philosophy. In him, no less than in Kant, thought is not cognitive of things, *i.e.*, of objects which are essentially distinct from the thoughts or notions of them, from their "Begriffe." The thing, apart from this, is for him "etwas Leeres," nothing else than our notions of it. To know the "Begriffe" is for Hegel the same as to know the things. In consequence of this conviction, therefore, the notions, or concepts, or thoughts, in reality, exclude him just as much as they do Kant from the things. The only difference is that Kant is aware of this, knows that knowledge for him cannot be knowledge of things in themselves; whereas, Hegel believes that his thoughts, so far from standing between him and the things, are the essence of the things—that he has grasped truth, when in reality he has just missed it. A kind of materialistic conception or method of regarding thought lies at the basis of the position we are criticising. When it is said thought cannot transcend itself, go out of itself, in order to know things which

are not themselves thoughts, there is at once truth and error in the statement. It is perfectly true that thought cannot, so to speak, get outside of itself; so as to cognize what lies beyond its limits as intelligence (though we quite concede that to it as intelligence there are no limits, none which are absolute). All such transcendence of itself by thought remains itself thought and a thinking process. But it is not necessary to suppose any such hopeless attempt of thought to outstrip itself in a race into the inane, in order to grant a knowledge of objects distinct from the thoughts of them. Thought has not got an "outside," like a water-barrel, nor are things "within" thought after the same fashion. Still, the very nature and essence of thought, and every particular thought, is the transcendence of itself, not of itself by itself as thinking (such transcendence remains itself still thought) but of itself *by* and *in* that which it thinks. Thought, without ceasing to be thinking, does, through its very nature as thought, in its relation to the object, cognitively go forth out of itself to it, and through the presence of the object which it thus cognitively determines is this the thinking cognition of thought itself determined. Thought is, in every case, the cognition of an object, which really, actually, existentially out of thought, is ideally, intellectually, intolligibly within it; and just because within in the latter sense, is it known as actually without in the former. So far, therefore, is it from being true, that as Hegel says, we may disregard the thing which is set up as a rule for our notions, on the ground that it can itself for us be nothing else than our notions of it; that the very reverse is the case, and the very nature of the notions is to know—that that of which they are the

notions, is in itself *something* else than the notions of it—a something to which they must conform.

There is thus a primitive synthesis with objectivity involved in the very nature of thought. In the agreement of thought with its object Truth consists. Truth is, therefore, not indeed identical with thought, but an ideal involved in its very nature. The various modes in which this agreement exists will be considered when we come to consider particular kinds of truth. There may, for instance, be some kinds of truth in which, if the thought exists at all, its agreement with its object also necessarily exists. There may, on the other hand, appear to be thoughts which have no real objectivity corresponding to them. Here we shall merely distinguish carefully our conception of truth and the objectivity which it involves, from what appear to be erroneous theories on the same subject. We have said above that truth is an ideal involved in the very nature of thought. This may be so understood or interpreted as to place truth, not in a relation of thought to an objectivity distinct from itself, but, so to speak, in a relation of thought to itself. The reference of thought to the thing may be conceived, as Hegel says, as "falling together" with the innermost nature of thought itself, so that in examining its inner movement and essence, we also find "the Reason of that which is, the truth of that which bears the name of the things." We have already pointed out the similar error in Schelling's system. He did not see that Nature and Mind, the object and the subject, can only be understood when viewed in perpetual relativity to each other. The identity of Spirit and Nature may be true as an ideal identity. The silent power of the ideal may rule and reason itself, may be present in the phenomena of

Nature, but all this is not explained by the use of the word identity; nor is the relation of mind to the universe comprehended by conceiving Nature as an unripe intelligence and matter as extinguished spirit. The defect in Schelling's philosophy, says Hegel, is that the point of indifference of subject and object, or the notion of reason, is absolutely presupposed without being proved as truth. Hegel, on the contrary, undertook to show the absolute, its distinction into the ideal and natural world, and the totality of their determinations as, through the notion, in themselves necessary. In doing so he conceives thought as undergoing such a process of development that its relations to itself involve also its relations to the things through which it is their essence, and he is thus able to conceive the absolute as not mere repose, but just as much the source of infinite movement. There is in this method of Hegel deep truth. The reference to the thing lies in the very heart of thought, and thought cannot be itself understood apart from this reference. But Hegel was not content to understand this reference as mere reference, but erected it into the very heart and essence of the thing to which thought refers. The intellectual reference thus becomes substantiated into a thing over against the thought which refers itself to it, as that through which its own activity of reference exists. Thought is thus conceived to enter into quite mechanical relations with itself, and its own inner nature then necessarily manifests itself as freeing itself from these mechanical restraints, as bursting these bounds, as freeing itself from and solving the contradiction which exists between its inner nature and outward limits. The movement of thought is, therefore, confounded by Hegel with the movement and process of the thing, and is

conceived under such forms as transition, striking round, &c.; and the forms of this movement are conceived, not merely as principles of our intellectual life, but also as the indwelling souls of things. In all this Hegel has simply erred from not distinguishing the dialectical movement, of our intellectual cognitive processes (and not of ours merely, but of thinking in general, including the divine thinking as well) from the metaphysical movement the sequences and relations in the things. Nevertheless, the truth which underlies Hegel's confusion of Logic and Metaphysics is this, that neither thought nor being can be understood without the other, that they are interwoven in each other's being. If a single principle, if thought, is to give birth to these two spheres, it must contain within itself a principle of self-diremption, by which it may throw forth from itself the excrescence through which it is. Hegel's Logic was an inherent necessity for Idealism.

But the presence of a principle distinct from thought is manifest even in Hegel's own principle, the notion, or concept. This self-moving principle, whose forms are the living spirit of the actual, and which is itself the substantial basis of all determinate notions, has for Hegel no relation to another than itself. Even in the Idea which is the absolute unity of the notion and objectivity, the notion has not an objectivity which is distinct from itself. Still, in its self-moving process the notion does not proceed arbitrarily, but follows an immanent law, a law which it is itself. Hegel censures that view of the categories, which regards only their use and employment in experience, for the determination and discovery of the relations of objects, "whereby, however content and end the correctness and truth of

the thought which thus intrudes itself amongst the objects, is made wholly dependent from that which happens to be present, and to the thought-determinations for themselves, no content-determining activity is ascribed. Such a use of the categories before called natural logic, which assigns to them in scientific reflection the relation merely to serve as means, degrades thought in general to something subordinate to the other determinations of the mind. For of our feelings, impulses, passions, interests, &c., we cannot say that they serve us. They are rather independent powers and forces which we must serve. Consequently, we can much less think that the thought-forms which pervade all our representations, whether they be merely theoretical or contain matter belonging to feeling, impulse, will, serve us; that we have them, and not rather that they have us in possession. What is remaining over to us as regards them? How are we, how am I to place myself outside as the universal over them, they which are themselves the universal as such? When in any feeling or desire we feel ourselves in bondage, the place to which we can withdraw and regain our freedom, is this place of self-certainty, of pure abstraction, of thought. Likewise, when we speak of things we call their nature or essence their notion, and this is only for thought; but of the notions of things will we still less say that we govern them, or that the thought-determinations of which they are the complex serve us. On the contrary, our thought must limit itself according to them, and our will or freedom must not think of fitting them to itself." It is clear from these extracts that the last thing which Hegel would attribute to the notion, is to connect with it the power of arbitrary determination. Neither from the side of the things, nor

from the side of the subject, can an external or higher power intervene. Their "Begriff" is the nature and essence of the things, and our thinking must conform itself to the thought-determinations of which those things are the complex. But how comes it that this law, this necessity, exists in these notions or categories? These are the determining principles of things. By what are the thought-determination themselves determined? Whence comes the law which is immanent in them? The contradiction which is here involved is not confined to Hegel. The student encounters it already in Kant, and it runs through the whole line of transcendental thinkers. The categories in Kant are to determine things; but the act of thought in which this determination is exerted does not proceed arbitrarily. It is itself determined. By what? by itself? If this means that it can determine itself arbitrarily, at will, and pleasure, it is manifestly false. But if it means that in its self-determination it is subject to a law, this may be correct, but we are entitled to ask whence comes this law? It is not enough to say that it is a law which it gives to itself, for the question is, Whence comes the necessity that it must give this law to itself? In other words, we have in the very heart of this self-determination of thought, the evidence that its self-determination is through its determination by another. And this objection is valid against Hegel also. The very notion of notion is that of a determining which is only through being determined by another, by that which is not itself. For the very nature of thought is to think that which is not itself, through which therefore thought itself is. The relation of thought to objectivity must not be so conceived, as though thought were a something ready made, coming from elsewhere, and giving birth to

the objective world as it or its. In such a case it is itself only another object producing that world; but the fact is, it is itself only in the production of that by which it is produced. Thought produces the world of objects as being not produced by it, but from elsewhere; *and it is in this thinking of thought that it is produced and determined by that which it has not produced, that its production and self-production exists.* In considering the speculative basis of Religion it will be found that this determination of the relations of thought and being has an all-important significance. There results from it a proof that the creative force in Nature is in the most intimate union with thought, without being the same as it; that this union, unlike that of Will and Idea, in the more recent forms of German philosophy, is not one of violence or rude necessity, but is explicable only as the intelligent freedom of the First Cause in Nature; that the relation between being and thought is such as to demonstrate that Nature is the creation of a free intelligence. From an examination of the essence of thought and the object as we know them here in the world, we deduce the relation under which alone thought and an object of thought in general are possible. That relation is briefly this. Thought and thing arise and spring into existence together in correlative reference to each other. The very nature of thought, therefore, is to criticise itself, and of the criticism again to criticise itself; but the inner nature of the criticism, its very essence, lies in a constant reference to a standard other than itself by which the criticism itself is to be judged. The self-criticism of thought is one with its movement and development. The kernel of this movement Hegel discovered and reduced to its ultimate form; but because

he did not observe in the very inmost essence of his principle the reference to the external and objective, his principle stood in its own light, and prevented any real use being made of it. The criticism of thought by itself then is the stern discipline to which its own idea, Truth subjects thought. But this is no barren occupation with itself, for the test to which thought brings its own thinking ever lies outside of itself. Thought only finds its harmony with itself through its harmony with that which is not itself, viz., the object; and every new truth in science is a correction of its previous thinking, only because it reveals more fully the facts of Nature through which that truth exists.

The foregoing makes it clear in what sense we use the phrase "Objectivity of Truth." Truth is the agreement of thought with its object, but the object with which thought agrees is not merely itself in a state of alienation, outwardness, a mere outward being and working of thought, but a system of things, a world of reality in organic correlation with thought. In general the objectivity which Truth involves, is not so much an objectivity which thought *is*, as an objectivity which thought *has*. This objectivity is not Kant's. In his system the object derives all that makes it an object, gives to it order and regularity from the activity of the intelligence in cognition. His forms and categories are therefore in a sense objective, and operate in the only world of objectivity with which we are acquainted. But it is an objectivity which they *are*, not *have*. This objectivity is not Hegel's. It is true that there is for him objective thought, a thought and a Reason which is in the world. But this is a bastard objectivity. It merely points to thought here, and thought there; here conscious, there

unconscious, as if the naming and not the explanation of the fact were sufficient. If the arguments urged in this chapter are well grounded, an objectivity which is not removed altogether beyond the range, nor yet is a mere state or phase of thought itself, but which thought implies, not as put forth by itself, but as already there, is the Objectivity of Truth.

CHAPTER IV.

THE OBJECTIVITY OF TRUTH IN SCIENCE.

In the foregoing chapter we have endeavoured to establish the existence of a primitive synthesis of thought with objectivity, a synthesis at once real and ideal, in that it is itself the correlation, the unity, the mutual implication of ideal synthesis and real synthesis. That there exists in consciousness an ideal synthesis which involves at least the *thought*, the *conception* of a real synthesis, *i.e.*, of a real existence of the object out of, and as Kant would say, synthetically added on to the thought of it; that is admitted even by philosophers who nevertheless refuse to grant to this ideal synthesis an objective validity, to admit that *that which is thought* in it, is anything out of and beyond the thought or thinking of it, though obviously this is what the object of its thinking is to the thinking itself. Identifying the object of the thinking with the act of thinking itself, they are compelled

to divide consciousness and to re-introduce within the subjective sphere, as mere relations of thought to itself, those very relations of subject and object, which they refused to recognize in the simply given relations of thought and thing. That the effort to reduce objective relations to mere thought-relations, was in many respects legitimate and justifiable, was due to a well-founded intellectual necessity we do not deny. The highly important truth was contained therein that all relations of thought to its object are intelligible relations, relations which thought can think, that even the very relations by which we think an object as out of thought are themselves thoughts, and intelligibly within it. This was the truth of that philosophy. But its error consisted in not recognizing that these thought-relations, or thoughts of relations, had something more than themselves and their own existence for object, that thought without thing is thoughtless, that the ideal synthesis is only through the real. The root of the error lay in supposing that what is *really* out of consciousness, *i.e.*, is something more than the consciousness of it, may not be ideally, nay, even consciously, within it, that consciousness and its object may not be ideally identical, yet really distinct.

The position we have endeavoured to establish is thus that the very nature of consciousness is always to cognize more than itself, that of what is *really* out of consciousness we can still be certain, and certain with the certainty of consciousness. But here we are confronted by a class of facts which seem to constitute an insuperable objection. The whole of our reasoning goes to show that the ideal the thought-synthesis involves, is itself only possible through the actual presence of the real synthesis, that it lies in the nature of the ideal synthesis

to have an object and involve a real synthesis with an object which is something other and different from itself; in short, that the ideal synthesis and real synthesis involve each other. But there exists a class of cases in which the ideal synthesis does not apparently involve the real. There is no more common experience than the existence of error amongst men. Not to mention the illusions of dreams and the delirium of madness, what is more common, even in scientific thought, than error? Here the synthesis of thought with objectivity seems only a mere thought-synthesis; a real synthesis, a real objectivity being directly wanting. Nay, further, even when the belief in the truth of the synthesis is absent, and the mind is therefore under no illusion regarding it, in the fancies of imagination and reverie it must still be admitted that there exists in our thoughts that reference to objectivity which we have endeavoured to demonstrate as attaching to the nature of all thought, and yet that just in these cases the objectivity does not seem really to exist. "Even imaginary objects," says Mr. J. S. Mill, "(which are said to exist only in our ideas) are to be distinguished from our ideas of them. I may think of a hobgoblin as I may think of the loaf which was eaten yesterday, or of the flower which will bloom to-morrow. But the hobgoblin which never existed is not the same thing with my idea of a hobgoblin, any more than the loaf which once existed is the same thing with my idea of a loaf, or the flower which does not exist, but which will exist, is the same with my idea of a flower. They are all, not thoughts, but objects of thought; though at the present time all the objects are alike non-existent" (*Logic*, vol. i., p. 56). This distinction is also recognized by Fichte, who offers his own explanation of it. "*All being*," says he,

"signifies *a limitation of free activity.* Now this activity is contemplated either as that of the mere intelligence (as subject of consciousness), and then that which is posited as limiting only this activity has merely *an ideal being: mere objectivity in regard to consciousness* (blosse Objectivität in Bezug auf das Bewusstseyn). This objectivity is in every representation, even in that of the Ego, virtue, moral law, &c., or in the case of complete fictions, a quadrangular circle, a sphynx, &c., *object of the mere representation.* Or the free activity is contemplated as *acting, having causality,* and then that which limits has *real* existence, the actual world" (*Werke,* Bd. i., s. 495). If now we were compelled to admit this, that thought purely from out of itself could give birth, we will not say to objectivity, but to the mere idea, conception of the objective, to "blosse Objectivität in Bezug auf das Bewusstseyn," and this quite independent of any real objectivity, in fact, entirely without the concurrence of any objectively conditioning principle; then the argument which we have been advancing hitherto would be completely destroyed, and the possibility of an ideal synthesis which did not implicate a real synthesis would have to be conceded. Yet this is what the examples we have adduced seem to show. The illusions and errors of the human mind seem to be just cases in which consciousness, thought, gives birth to the conception of objectivity, apparently in independence of any conditioning objective reality.

In order to solve this difficulty it is necessary to draw a distinction between the objectivity of the object, and the particular object or thing to which this objectivity is conceived to belong. In other words, it may show itself in the sequel that where we feign or imagine a thing as

objective, our thought of the objectivity of the thing may involve, and in fact be possible, only through a real relation of objectivity, but that we err in applying the relation in question to just this thing or object which we have imagined, and that just as in our thoughts we can think an idea as referring to an objectivity which we are conscious does not properly attach to it, so also a real objectivity may be represented as having an object which is really wanting to it. The question, therefore, arises, What are the characteristics by which we shall know the objectivity in question?

In the first place, it is obvious that from the relation which is here assumed as existing between thought and objectivity—in that thought determines this objectivity, but only in and through the fact that it is, in its determining, determined by it—it is obvious from this, that in this case thought and its object must necessarily agree, and that in the case of such truth, if thought exists at all, its agreement with its object must also necessarily exist, and that the possibility of their disagreement will at once be inconceivable and unimaginable and, since thought is essential to being which latter is, and is being, only in determining thought, impossible. It is also obvious that in the relation between thought and this objectivity, which stands thus in simultaneous determining and determined relation with thought, the relation is one of immediate, not mediate cognition. We do not infer the nature of the object, or rather objectivity in question, from a prior given determination of thought, because this determination of thought by its object exists only in the process of the determination of the object by thought. What, then, is this objectivity distinct from the objects which are

objective in it? We shall give the answer in one word. It is Space. We here return to a point which has been already referred to. In our critique of the philosophy of Sir W. Hamilton, we said that his theory represents a highly important phase of the truth. The kernel of that theory is that there is an object or element of the object present to consciousness in such a manner, entering as a factor into the present constitution and existence of the knowing state, in such a way that without its immediate presence that state would not exist. The principle of this inference is, that without an actual non-Ego, even the appearance of knowing a non-Ego is impossible, and thereason of that is because in the very appearing the reality exists. In other words, space is the fundamental form of the non-Ego. Now, if we assume that space is subjective either in the sense of Empirical Idealists, as the result of laws of association, or in Kant's sense as *à priori* form, or in Hegel's as a phase of the Idea, as the self-externality of absolute thought, it is still true in all these cases, that the very law or principle, whether of association or of absolute thought through which space is to be produced, itself presupposes and is only possible through space. But as thus presupposed, in the very act or application of the principle which is to construct it, space is absolutely real and objective. Such constructions or deductions of space may have great value as *ideal* constructions of space, but the very *notion* of space is the notion of that through the reality of which the notion is. In this respect we must go a step even beyond Hegel. We must not conceive thought as being beside itself, and for once in a way performing the trick of turning itself inside out. Space is simply the notion of that externality to the notion, through which the notion

itself is. Space and the world is therefore neither phenomenal in relation to our subjective consciousness, as an Empirical Idealist or a Kantist holds, nor intrinsically phenomenal as Hegel declares, but a relatively independent objectivity over against thought. Thought or Reason is not the substance, but only the subject of the world. The principle from which all this flows, "a determining which in its determining is determined by that which it determines," we have already stated and proved.

It will be well now to point out how this conception of the relation of thought to space escapes the objections which were fatal to the Hamiltonian doctrine. The first objection to Hamilton's theory was that it presupposed the principles of the Kantian philosophy, and it is worthy of remark that Hamilton himself held his own Natural Realistic doctrine of space side by side with the Kantian theory; although, if the two doctrines are to be amalgamated, it can only be done by getting rid of Kant's doctrine of space as a subjective form of sense. The kernel of Hamilton's theory is, "We must be conscious of the object, because if the object were not there we could not have a consciousness of it." But how do we know that we could not have a consciousness, or an apparent consciousness of it? How can we know the conditions under which consciousness, or apparent consciousness, is possible? These conditions are not to be derived from that which is known or the object, for that would be a circle. They must therefore lie in the *knowing*, and be derived *à priori* from the nature of knowing itself. But this requires the Kantian principle that the knowing put its own nature into that which is known, if the possibility of such conditions known

à priori is to be explained. But this directly contradicts Natural Realism, for it puts our own subjective nature and a phenomenal world between us and the things, and thus shuts us off from objectivity in the Natural-Realistic sense. Under these circumstances, Hamilton can only fall back on the subjective assurances of consciousness, which just amount to, "We are conscious the object is no illusion, and if it were we could have no such consciousness." And at bottom Hamilton is right. We can determine the conditions under which our consciousness is possible, not because these conditions are in our knowing and we must put them into the known, but because our determining, our consciousness itself, is determined by the conditions which it determines. The being determined by objectivity is itself the very principle according to which consciousness actively determines objectivity. "Intuition," says Fichte, "is an activity which is not possible without a passivity, and a passivity which is not possible without an activity;" and, as he correctly remarks, "this condition in which perfectly-opposed directions are combined is just the activity of the imaginative faculty" (*Werke*, Bd. I., S. 228, 229). Subject and object are two poles which rise into existence simultaneously, and contain in and through one another the principles of their determination and correlation.

The next objection to Hamilton's doctrine was that of implying a pre-established harmony in the sense of its requiring a preformed suitability for each other on the part of subject and object. And here we must again concede that there is a harmony, and in a sense pre-established. But pre-established may here mean *pre-formation*, in the sense that while thought and its object are yet apart, an omnipotent power and intelligence

framed and fitted each for the other. Such a preformation theory must be at once rejected. An exploded conception of the nature of the soul as a separate substance lies at its basis. But the deeper truth here involved is that thought and objectivity in this sense are not, and never were apart from each other; that the pure intelligence implicitly present throughout nature is but the counterpart of the pure space which is explicitly there; that the mutual reference, of subjectivity and objectivity, of thought and thing, finds its explanation in the presence of an Eternal Consciousness and in the working of an Eternal Power, not *in* or *as* Nature, but *to* Nature and *through* Nature.

The last objection to Hamilton's theory was the existence of an apparent objectivity in consciousness, an objectivity which seems in dreams, &c., to be wholly the creation of the subject, and therefore seems to imply on the part of mind an independence of reality, to testify on the one hand to a delusiveness in the voice of consciousness, and on the other hand to a freedom from objectivity as its condition. And this objection is fatal to Hamilton, so far as Natural Realism claims for any particular object the *immediate* testimony of consciousness. At best consciousness can only testify that the object possesses some objectivity; but this is valueless, inasmuch as consciousness gives no immediate testimony as to what the object is which possesses it, be it distant, at the point of sense, in the brain, or where it may. We have already, in what goes before, given the sense in which Hamilton's theory must be held fast. In that we have distinguished the objectivity of the object from the object itself, and identified it with space, and assigned this as that objectivity which stands in

immediate relation with thought, it follows that it is only in regard to space, actual, real space, it is true, but still considered merely in itself, merely as pure space, that the Hamiltonian theory holds true.

Having thus explained the relation of our view of objectivity to the doctrines of that important philosophical movement which found its final expression in the Natural Realism of Hamilton and Mansel, it may, perhaps, throw further light upon the foregoing theory of space if we compare and contrast it with the Kantian doctrine. Kant sets out in his system from the existence of experience and objects of experience, to discover or infer the conditions under which experience and its objects are possible. Among these conditions which are necessary to the existence of experience, and therefore of objects of experience, he finds *à priori* principles and *à priori* knowledge. In this field of *à priori* knowledge, the sciences of Geometry and Arithmetic occupy a prominent place. Kant inquires, How are these sciences possible? How is it possible to know *à priori* of objects, the truths which these sciences contain? His answer to this question is that space and time are subjective forms which impose their own nature on the objects which we know. In this way are explained the characteristics of *à priori* knowledge—viz., its necessity and universality. Mere experience may tell us what is and has been, not that it must necessarily be so, and not otherwise.

This distinction of Kant between *à priori* and empirical cognitions must be accepted. Nevertheless we are convinced the hypothesis by which this distinction is accounted for cannot be maintained, and this primary and fundamental difference in the elements of human know-

ledge is accurately exhibited by neither the Kantian nor the Empirical school. That we possess a number of judgments which conform to the criterion of Kant, which are both universal and necessary, must be admitted. Geometry and Arithmetic present synthetical truths which are recognized as necessarily and universally true. But that these truths must have their origin, not without but within, in the constitution of the mind, is an inference indeed, but not a necessary conclusion from the facts. The necessity of mathematical principles by no means compels us to regard space and time as mere subjective elements in our knowledge. On the contrary, this necessity may be the result, not of subjective forms in the mind, but of the nature of the relation borne to the mind by space and time existing as objective realities. To the examination of this relation, therefore, in connection with the doctrine of objectivity already enunciated, our attention must be directed. In Kant's doctrine the necessity and universality of mathematical truths is explained by the fact that we impose on objects the subjective constitution of our own minds; in other words, the world of objects is built up out of sensations, by means of categories, into a world of experience existing in space and time. Now space and time, as belonging to the subjective constitution of the mind, are a permanent and constant factor in this experience; we can therefore have in mere imagination an experience of what will and must be,* and further-

* Cf. *Text-book to Kant*, by Dr. Stirling, p. 358:—"Where the question is of pure non-empirical or *à priori* synthetics, Anschauung plays for Kant the part of Erfahrung." "To have recourse to imagination for the realization of a triangle is the same thing as to have recourse to Anschauung. Actual inspection of an object outwardly (by special sense) or inwardly (by general sense-imagination) is Anschauung."

more we cannot imagine the contrary. Now all these characteristics which attach to Kant's doctrine of the subjectivity of space are still retained if we directly reverse it, and instead of saying "our mind imposes its subjective constitution upon the objective world," we say "the objective world imposes its objective constitution (its objectivity, viz., space) upon mind." The question then as to the relation of space and mind may be so expressed. Does not objectivity, *i.e.*, space, real, actual space, belong quite as much to the images of imagination as to the things perceived by sense? That this is the case the following considerations seem to show. Sensation is the consciousness of certain affections of our body as an animated organism. Perception in its primary sense is the knowledge of the relations which these affections bear to space, and by means of which space becomes an object of consciousness. Hence the extension, as existing in which we are conscious of them, is an antecedent condition to which our sensations must conform. Of that extension or space in which the organ of sensation exists, and of that only am I conscious, so that the space in which the causes of sensation exist, and in fact the extra-organic world, is represented by that space in which the sensations or nervous currents with their qualities exist. Now imagination is the revival of former sensations. Is the revived image, the product of the mental effort, reproduced in the nervous system? To prove that this is the case we have only to bring forward the very arguments which Kant advances for the subjectivity of space. For if the images of imagination are not reproduced in the nervous system but in an immaterial mind, then the Kantian hypothesis is incontrovertible. But if the phenomena of imagination

are reproduced in the nervous system, then such phenomena must conform to the same conditions as does that in and through which they are reproduced. Instead of a mind which imposes universally a constant condition upon phenomena, we have a mind whose phenomena, being all identical and not merely connected with certain states of a material organization, is subject to the same fundamental form of objectivity with this organization, viz., Space.*

It is this necessary connection of the representations of imagination with space which constitutes the real synthesis involved in every ideal one. Only through this real objectivity is the ideal reference to objectivity possible. The objective reality of space can never be a matter of doubt. A dream and a perception alike testify to its real existence. Its determinations are never mere forms of phantasy, but are equally real in imagination as in perception. The annihilation of space as real would also be the annihilation of space as ideal. The unreality of the images of imagination no more renders the space in which they exist unreal, than the picture renders the space unreal in which the canvas is stretched.

The above view is still more applicable to time. Phenomena in general we cannot think as out of time. It lies at the basis of all external and internal phenomena. The judgments derived therefrom are universal and

* On the preceding principle the belief in the real existence of a non-Ego in dreams, imagination, memory, &c., is true. Mr. Mill's powerful *argumentum ad hominem* against Hamilton (*Exam. of H.* p. 224) is against the Natural Realism which we have here put forward not only powerless, but, in fact, confirms it. Cf. in support of the theory generally: *Hamilton's Lectures*, ii, pp. 168, 169, 423, 433. Bain, *Senses and the Intellect*, pp. 336-340. Monck, *Space and Vision*.

necessary. Time exists not merely as a mode of the subject, but as independent of subject and object. It is the form of their synthesis, and is present in all facts of thought as the condition to which those facts must submit. To assert that time exists out of ourselves in space, or that it exists in the mind alone, as a form or condition of consciousness is equally unmeaning, for time does not exist in space or in mind, but both mind and space exist in time. Time cannot be an outward existence. It has to do neither with shape nor locality, nor does it occupy space. Nor yet can it be an inward existence, for outward objects are given in their own nature as in relation to it; the fact being that we cannot speak of the inward or outward existence of that in which the inward and outward themselves exist. Time, as a common element in subject and object, is related to imagination just like space, not as being itself imagined, but as that *in* which our imaginations exist.

It may be urged against the foregoing theory that it does not explain completely the necessity which attaches to mathematical judgments. That is not merely a necessity of thought that we are compelled to think and to imagine in accordance with these laws. It is an intellectually-perceived necessity that the thing must be so always and everywhere. But the only necessity contained in the above theory, is the matter-of-fact necessity to think and to perceive the space which is present in the imaginative faculty. What guarantee is there, that in our movements through space we may not suddenly enter upon space which just reverses all the truths of our present Geometry? Now, without entering upon the question whether the latter is in point of fact a thinkable or possible contingency, let us see whether

Kant's doctrine of Space accounts for any other necessity than the matter-of-fact one. And it is evident that it does not. Kant's space is just simply the actual constitution of our subjectivity, just as the space in the foregoing theory is the actual nature and constitution of objectivity. Space stands in precisely the same relation to imagination in the one case and in the other, the only difference is that in the Kantian doctrine I carry my space about with me, in the other the mind is always subject to precisely similar spatial conditions.

The fact is the kind of necessity referred to, if it is to be found at all, must not be sought merely in the laws and forms of sensibility which condition the receptivity of sensation, but in the intellectual side of our nature. It must be a mode of relation involved in the very nature of thought. It must be shown from the nature of thought in general, that it generates the conditions under which the object is, and is thought. Now it may be said that for the purpose of receiving such an intellectual necessity from elsewhere, Kant's space, as subjective, is better situated. An objective space remains hard matter-of-fact, with only matter-of-fact necessity; but Kant's space, as subjective, is better suited for coming under the categories and receiving from them a synthetic intellectual necessity. And the real significance of Kant's doctrine of the subjectivity of space lies in the fact that it is thus, as subjective, subordinated to the unity of apperception, and that the conditions which it imposes on objects might, perhaps, thus be regarded as universal conditions of objects springing from the very nature of thought in general, since space is itself determined by thought. The question is, Is it necessary, in order to explain the determination of space in accordance with

universal conditions of thought, to retain the Kantian doctrine of its subjectivity?

And first, it must be remarked, that the subjective individualistic Idealism of the Kantian philosophy is a philosophical standpoint which has been long passed by. It is no longer necessary, in order to think the determination of space by thought, to suppose that this can only take place within the limits of the individual intelligence. The thought which is present in nature is not merely *my* thought, nor must nature be brought and confined within *my* mind in order to exhibit agreement with the laws of intelligence. But that our space, objective though it be, is in immanent agreement with thought, from which it is ideally derived, is evident from the exposition we have given of the relation of objectivity to thought. The intellectual necessity of thought within us, is but the counterpart of the intellectual necessity of universal thought without.

Before quitting this subject, it may be well to examine somewhat more minutely than we have already done the nature of space and its relation to intelligence as conceived by Hegel. The point concerns one of the acknowledged difficulties of the Hegelian philosophy, the transition from the Logic to the "Naturphilosophie." Thought is here conceived as transcending itself, but this transcendence is conceived as taking place merely in thought, and its essence as consisting in thought. The transition from the Logical Idea to a world of external existence in space and time has been termed "der wunde Punkt des Hegel'schen Systems." Already in 1834 had Schelling directed his criticism against this point (cf. *Werke*, Bd. X., s. 212, 213). The pretended self-movement of the notion holds good, says Schelling, so

long as the system remains within the limits of the merely Logical, but so soon as it comes to make "den schweren Schritt in die Wirklichkeit," the thread of the dialectical movement breaks off entirely. The same objection has been also taken up and urged by Dr. Eduard von Hartmann. After urging his objections to Hegel's dialectical method, Dr. von Hartmann proceeds to say "that, even granting the truth of that method and that the immanent negativity of the Idea is its principle of movement and development, nevertheless this would only hold good for the sphere of the Idea as Idea, the Idea in its In-itself-being. The contradiction might indeed lead the Idea, so far as to unfold as ideal Archetype of Reality the entire wealth of the forms enclosed within it, *i.e.*, describe the circle of Hegel's Logic, but the contradiction immanent in the Logical Idea could never explain the passage of the Idea out of the ideal sphere into that of reality."—Cf. *Neukantianismus, Schopenhauerianismus und Hegelianismus*, s. 270.

With these criticisms I cannot agree. Hegel's Idea is not a sphere existing in itself apart and distinct from Nature and Spirit. It has not to pass out of the Ideal sphere into that of Reality to make "den schweren Schritt in die Wirklichkeit," just because it is already in a manner there. In the Idea the Notion is one with Objectivity. "Hegel," says Michelet, "braucht nicht erst den schweren Schritt in die Wirklichkeit zu machen weil er mit seiner Welldialektik schon immer in der Wirklichkeit est" (*Entwickelungsgeschichte der neuesten Deutschen Philosophie*, s. 281).* And Hegel himself says, "Indem die Idee, sich nämlich als absolute

* Cf. *Vorrede des Herausgebers Hegel's Werke*, Bd. 7 i., s. xv. "Wo stürzt nun die logische Idee bei Hegel in der Natur, wie

Einheit des reinen Begriffs und seiner Realität sezt, somit in die Unmittelbarkeit des Seyns zusammenniment, so ist sie als die Totalität in dieser Form,—Natur.—Diese Bestimmung ist aber nicht ein *Gewordenseyn* und *Uebergang*, wie nach oben der subjective Begriff in seiner Totalität zur Objectivität, auch der subjective Zweck zum Leben wird. Die reine Idee, in welcher die Bestimmtheit oder Realität des Begriffes selbst zum Begriffe erhoben ist, ist vielmehr absolute Befreiung, für welche keine unmittelbare Bestimmung mehr ist, die nicht ebenso sehr *gesetzt* und der Begriff ist; in dieser Freiheit findet daher kein *Uebergang* statt, das einfache seyn, zu dem sich die Idee bestimmt, bleibt ihr vollkommen durchsichtig, und ist der in seiner Bestimmung bei sich selbst bleibende Begriff. Das *Uebergehen* is also hier vielmehr so zu fassen, dass die *Idee* sich selbst *frei* entlässt, ihrer absolut sicher und in sich ruhend."—*Werke*, Bd. v., s. 352-3; cf. also *Encycl.* §§ 18, 244.

Hartmann's objection therefore, that even granting the truth of the dialectical method and of the self-movement of the notion, that movement must still remain confined within the Ideal sphere, falls to the ground. Whatever view we take of Hegel's dialectical method, it is certain that it is above and beyond the antithesis of the Ideal and the Real.* Nevertheless we have seen reason to

Schelling will, sich gluchsam über? Sie bleibt immer im Gedanken braucht aber auch nicht erst den schweren Schritt in die Wirklichkeit zu thun," weil der Gedanke mit dem wahrhaft Wirklichen der Natur zusammenfällt.

* Whether we view the movement of the notion as also the ruling law and impelling force in the field of reality, as Hegel does, or as a subjective movement correlated with an objective real movement (as we regard it), in both cases the Antithesis is overcome in the former case mechanically, in the latter intellectually.

question this method as it stands in Hegel. When looked at closely the notion of self-movement, self-determination vanishes in itself. It is itself possible only through the presupposition of that which it is the very nature of the notion to render impossible to presuppose.* Or it is the explanation of synthesis, movement, by movement itself, which being thus identical with itself, there is rather no movement or synthesis whatever present. A self-generating movement is impossible. But in the principle we have stated above "a determining which in its determining is determined by that which it determines," self-determination is present as a moment or element in the synthesis. We must, therefore, while rejecting its absolute self-determination, so far agree with Hegel and concede to thought this *intellectual* movement. Thought is in truth "more moving than any motion, it passeth and goeth through all things by reason of its pureness," and Hartmann errs completely when he denies the presence of any movement in the Idea. "In der ewigen reinen Idee in ihrem Ansichseyn giebt es keinen Trieb weil keine Entwickelung, im Kopfe des Philosophen aber ist der Trieb des Denkfortganges von dem allgemeinen Willen zum Leben, vom Weltwillen oder dem absolut Unlogischen entliehen" † (*Neukantianismus, Schopen-*

* From this point of view it is possible to criticize Hegel's entire system. His system as a whole presupposes a world of objects if only to deprive it of its character as presupposed, which being accomplished, the presupposition of his system is destroyed, and consequently his system itself. Again his Becoming presupposes Being, but the only Being which there is, is one which is already a moment in Becoming.

† Hartmann's system, which is a combination of Hegel and Schopenhauer, neglects what is the profoundest element of truth in Hegel. That is the presence in the very nature of thought itself,

hauerianismus und Hegelianismus, s. 272). To apply this principal to space. According to Hegel philosophy first establishes, by means of the notion, the necessary thought, and then inquires how this thought appears in our "Vorstellung." In order to prove that space is in accordance with our thought (the thought, namely, of the pure "Aussersichseyn") we must, he says, compare our representation of space with the determination of the notion. Now this we hold is erroneous. The thought, or rather thought, is itself only through the space which it thinks, and in thinking space its thinking is determined by the properties of the space which it determines.

It will serve to place this in a clearer light if we refer to a controversy which has been carried on regarding Kant's space. It has been said that Kant in choosing

of the reference to reality, an element of truth the importance of which is in no degree lessened, if we refuse to regard this reference with Hegel as essential identity. In general v. Hartmann has not sought to trace, in the nature of thought and reality, the many ties which bind them together and keep them in one another's grasp. Thus the fact that Will or force cannot "pass by," but must realize the Idea, is itself due to the nature of the Idea which is realized by it, for the only thought which exists is one that necessarily involves that through which it is realized. But in Hartmann this synthesis must be supplied by a third something, viz, the postulated "Unconscious" in which Will and Idea are united. But such a subject with its negative predicates "unconscious," "immaterial," is an utter fiction. The only Will and Idea which exist, are the Power and Conscious Thought in the Universe. As Hegel tells us, the Idea is not so powerless as to be unable to realize itself. All that is rational is real, and all that is real is rational. Hence also the possibility of a negative "Endzweck" for the world, and with it Hartmann's Pessimism, disappear. That Hartmann arrives at his results empirically and problematically, only means that they are postulates or hypotheses whose probability consists in this, that they are necessary in order to keep the elements of his system from falling asunder.

between the objectivity and subjectivity of space forgot that there was a third view possible, viz., that space might be both objective and subjective. To this it has been replied that Kant's space is objective in the only sense in which objectivity of space is admissible, viz., it is empirically objective. Notwithstanding this, it is to be remarked, that space, according to Kant, is entirely subjective in one sense, viz., that it and the world of experience exist within my mind. It is of objectivity as opposed to subjectivity in this sense, that the question is here. May not space then be transcendentally objective or real as well as subjective? Now when it is said that space may be both objective and subjective in this sense, this may have two meanings. It may mean that space is here within me and there without, so to speak, twice over. Such a process of "supervacaneously doubling" it, as has been said in the case of Sir W. Hamilton, is of course absurd. But there is yet another sense in which the expression may be understood. It may mean that into the nature of the one space, there enter an intellectual and an objective principle, that space is ideal-real, that space is in its intelligible nature one with thought, and that the thought of that which renders thought real, is the thought of space which thus *is*, in the rendering real of the thought of itself.* *Pure* thought and *pure* space

* *Cf.* Fichte, *Wissenschaftslehre aus dem Jahre*, 1801. "Kein Raum, ohne Construction desselben ohnerachtet nicht *er* sondern nur sein Bewusstseyn dadurch erzeugt werden soll (ideales Verhältniss); Keine Construction ohne ihn vorauszusetzen (reales Verhältniss)" (*Werke*, Bd. ii., s. 93). The distinction of ideal and real space has been made by Malebranche. We must not, however, separate these as though the ideal space did not involve the reality of itself, and as though the real space were not through and through ideal. There are not two spaces but only one.

did such abstractions exist, would be one. At bottom Ego and Space are one.* Ego is the ideality of space, a vanishing point in space is the reality of the Ego. The space, therefore, with which geometry deals, is as much matter of fact and objective as intellectual and ideal. Neither space nor thought, it is true, exist purely in themselves, out of all relation to definite contents and determinations. As a present real factor in imagination it is the source of that objective synthesis corresponding to the subjective, which at first sight seems absent in the case of errors and illusions. Such cases, however, prove neither a freedom of the subjective synthesis from the objective, nor absolute untruth and error on the part of the subjective synthesis. Real objectivity, quite as much as subjectivity, enters as a component element into human error.

From this consideration of the Objectivity of Truth in Mathematics, we pass to the Experimental Sciences. These sciences repose ultimately on what is involved in certain principles or laws of Causality, Permanence, &c. Formerly the grand method for the explanation of Nature was the appeal to substances, essences, occult qualities and soporific virtues. Times are changed, and now a Category or Law of Phenomena must do all that sort of work. Of the two expressions, the latter is perhaps the most harmless but also the most trivial. This can be said at least, it carries with it a reference to and dependence upon things; but when it is said we can only know laws of phenomena, the fact is lost sight of, that such a law, as

* *Cf.* Fichte, *Werke*, Bd. ii., s. 98. "Und sind wir denn nicht selbst Raum?" We naturally tend to represent the soul as an indivisible point. *Cf.* Locke, *Essay*, B. iv., chap. x., s. 10. "Divide matter into as many parts as you will (which we are apt to imagine a sort of spiritualizing, or making a thinking thing of it)."

the expression of a scientific truth, is in itself the knowledge of more than itself. We have here the same belief which, from the time of Plato, has continued itself amongst those who philosophize about science, viz., that there can only be a science of universals. The scientific man himself has always in the individual things, whose *nature* he investigates, the objective correlative of the laws and truths existing in his mind. But metaphysicians have always inclined to regard the law or truth in the mind either as itself identical with the object known, or, if not identical, as identical with all that can be known of the object. In the former point of view the truth or thought is the essence of the object, and the object is merely its external existence; in the latter case, we only know our knowledge of the object, and not that of which it is the knowledge. Both of these views amount to pretty much the same thing. Both substitute our knowledge of the object for the object itself, but then the first thinks that this is the very object, whereas the Phenomenalist is conscious that it is not. Neither of them have discerned that a judgment, a general proposition, implicates in itself something more than itself. A law of phenomena or things is itself produced by the individual things of which it is the law; and just in this it consists, namely, in determining that the things of which it is the law shall be such as to produce or realize it. We have here again the two moments, a determining, which is self-determination, only because that which it determines, it determines as being itself absolutely determined by it. An autonomy, whose autonomy consists in subjecting itself completely to heteronomy, gives birth to the harmony of science.

In Kant we find a near approach to this view, but he

seems to begin and end with an altogether different theory. According to Kant, sense presents us with the data of sensation. Understanding, by means of the categories, orders and arranges the data. In themselves the facts of sense are a chaotic manifold. Our minds give them their order and system, and so doing create the laws of nature. The category of causality, for example, is to produce through its *schema* that necessary succession of events according to a rule which prevails in nature. The category of causality is thus, according to Kant, itself the cause of causality, of causal connection, existing in the world. It gives to the data of sensation that objective necessary order which, in themselves, they do not possess. But it has been shown by Dr. Stirling,* that Kant, in order to get his intellectual apparatus to work, is obliged to postulate an empirical order in the facts of sense themselves, which Dr. Stirling calls "empirical instruction." This empirical instruction consists in a subjective order of existence in the sense impressions, and is *in fact* the same thing with that objective necessary order, with which the category is intended to invest the facts of sense. That is, in other words, Kant cannot bring his categories into *use* without already implying that order or succession, which it is the function of the categories first of all to create. Such an order of existence or occurrence in the facts of sense is, if not identical with the category, at least identical with what the category is to effect. We have here, therefore, a very striking difficulty, that its own work must be there already before the category, in order for the category itself to be. But if we consider the matter attentively, we shall find that this apparent

* *Journal of Speculative Philosophy*, January, 1879, and January, July, October, 1880. See also *Text-book to Kant.*

paradoxical position is, in point of fact, the truth of the case. Nay, not only is this presupposing of its own work of what it is itself to effect, necessary to the *use* of the category, as Kant is compelled to assume, but it is necessary to its very existence and its being what it is. The category has its being as much outside of itself as in itself. This "subjective" order of sensation, as Kant considers it, is nothing but the order of being, "the objective correlative" as we have called it, corresponding to the intellectual order of the category, and both these orders are inseparably bound together, and have their being in and through each other. The necessity to the category, therefore, of presupposing its own peculiar activity as there before itself in order for itself to be, is no peculiarity of subjective Idealism, and of its mere use or employment of the categories. It belongs to the very being and essence of the categories, and attaches equally to them whether the standpoint be that of subjective or absolute Idealism. It is this characteristic of the categories, as of all thought which subverts the position of a *merely* Idealistic philosophy. As Bishop Butler says, "abstract notions can do nothing." We may add they cannot even of themselves be.

It will place this in a clearer light if we assume for a moment the contrary, and assert that "abstract notions," that thought, can give birth not merely to itself, but also to the world of real things. Thought so conceived is creative, and the mind which thus thinks is a creative understanding. We have only to develop what is implied in this notion to make it lose its one-sidedness and correct itself. The creative force which thought thus exercises is something more than thought itself, it is the essence of the object which is thought *of*. If we conceive

thought as creative we must not conceive this as a self-creating, self-determining of itself into the manifold objects which constitute the world. Such a world remains a world of shadows, even the ideal existence of which is impossible. The force which thought thus posits is the real force which operates in the world of real things, which, however, in its very origin we may rightly hold to be under thought's control. If we place ourselves at the point of creation we must not conceive the Divine Mind as first determining in its own thoughts the things and laws of creation, and then creating in accordance with those thoughts; nor yet must we conceive the Divine thoughts as identical with the world and its laws, as constituting their essence and being; but the thinking is rather the thinking of the creating, and the creating the creating of the thinking both at once. In other words, we may hold fast the conception of a creative-understanding, but let us be earnest with the *creating* and recognize that the understanding has in the creative force which it exercises, an object over against itself, through which it is itself created. To discuss, however, the relations of thought and objectivity not as they present themselves in the forms of finite knowledge, but as they are in their eternal relativity and essence, is to pass from Science to Theology.

CHAPTER V.

THE OBJECTIVITY OF TRUTH IN RELIGION.

He who inquires into the nature of the object of the religious consciousness or God encounters a difficulty which does not exist, or at least does not exist to the same degree, in the case of the other sciences. The objects of the other sciences exist within the field of possible experience, and the meaning of the terms which they employ is capable of being illustrated by concrete objects. It may, for example, be a matter of difficulty to define exactly what the words "animal," "plant," "life," exactly mean, but we can at least point out the objects in the animal or vegetable world to which the terms refer. Even in the mathematical sciences, whatever difficulty may otherwise lie in such terms as "infinity," it is always possible to indicate what that is which, under certain conditions, becomes infinite. But where can we point to that which in any relations, or under any conditions, can be said *objectively* to become God?

If, however, for us at the present stage of our intellectual development this seems difficult if not impossible, it is still by no means difficult to point out objects which may *subjectively* become God—that is, objects which though not actually in themselves God, yet become through their relation to the feelings of the worshipper, *for him*, invested with Divine attributes. The more striking objects of nature tend everywhere among ruder nations to awaken such feelings. The fact that these

objects strike the mind with *religious* awe, awaken feelings not merely of curiosity, surprise, fear, but feelings which have over and above a distinctly religious character seems to indicate an inward source of the idea through relation to, or confusion with which inanimate things and living creatures are invested with attributes which do not inherently, or at least immediately belong to them.

We seem to be led to a similar conclusion when we consider the opposite or negative state of mind. When the critical intellect surveys the objects natural or imaginary, the things, animals, persons, to whom mankind have paid Divine honours and declares that they are not Divine, that they are not God, and then proceeds on these grounds to deny the existence of any such being; its procedure still presupposes an idea or standard in accordance with which it judged—a latent norm of Divine things, with which it compared the objects of human worship and found them wanting.

It thus appears that without some knowledge of God, some latent criterion of His nature and being, even the denial of His existence becomes an impossible act. It is not because the religious emotions are extinct, that the educated mind refuses to see in the things of nature, considered merely as such, the objects of its reverence and trust. It is partly because its conception of what the objects of nature are, has changed, partly because its idea or standard of the Divine has become a higher one, that it refuses to finite things, the adoration which it reserves for the Infinite.

This inference, however, that the notion of God, that the idea or standard of His nature and being, which we conceive is *à priori* and internal, rather than empirical and external, in its origin, encounters some formidable

difficulties. Leaving out what may be said in support of the general doctrine that all human knowledge, that all our ideas spring either immediately or mediately, either through intuition or inference from experience, and admitting that the idea of God is present in the mind after a different manner, the problem of the relation of this idea to its object and to the world of finite existence still remains. Even if experience is not the source of the idea, it is still the occasion or condition of its manifestation, and from first to last, the idea retains and includes in it a reference to the phenomena of that world of experience upon occasion of which it arises. It is not merely in its historical genesis in the human mind, as confused with things animate or inanimate, with creatures living or dead, that the idea of God mingles itself with the things of the earth. Long after the apparently fitful phenomena of nature have ceased to be viewed, as immediately manifesting a Divine presence and caprice, the forces by which are caused, and the laws which they obey, are conceived as evidencing the existence of God. It is, therefore, important to consider in what way the idea of God is related to the rest of the complex mass of detail with which experience has furnished the mind. Upon the answer to this question depends, in a large measure, the import and significance of the idea.

Now, in the first place, let it be granted that the idea of God is *à priori*, that already in the innermost nature of our minds, of thought, there is implicitly present the idea of God and of our relation to Him. The question of the legitimacy and objective validity of the idea at once arises. It is true the *à priori* existence of the idea cannot be established on merely empirical grounds. But even admitting its presence in the intellect, we are still entitled

to inquire how it came there, to ask for the credentials by which it may claim to be accepted at our hands. And here it is evident that the only way in which such a claim can be vindicated, is, if the idea can be shown to be involved in the very possibility of experience and the objects of experience, of our thinking and the things which we think; to be, in fact, one with the nature and movement of thought. In other words, it may be possible to show that the consciousness of God is implied in the consciousness of ourselves, and of the world of objects distinct from ourselves which we perceive, that it constitutes the innermost essence of our being, that in the inward experience of the religious life the antithesis of subject and object is overcome, and the finite consciousness is raised into communion with and participation in the infinite life and consciousness of God.

In such a view there is an element of truth. At the basis of the religious life there lies a certain unity of the soul with God, a certain identity of our thought with His. But what is the Mind or Spirit into unity with which the human spirit thus tries to raise itself? The only mind or spirit which we know is finite spirit, spirit which is personal, conscious, affected with the antithesis of subject and object. Can we attribute these predicates to the Infinite Spirit? Has God consciousness and self-consciousness distinct from our consciousness of Him? When we attribute to other finite minds a consciousness distinct from that of ourselves, we mean that they have a separate independent existence apart from our consciousness, that a world of objects stands over against them which they know and in knowing which they exist. But these determinations cannot be affirmed of a Being who is revealed only in the process in which such distinctions

are annulled. It has been well said that "the sublime intellectual condition in which subject and object are identified is a degradation of man to the level possibly of a zoophyte." And what is a degradation of man is no less a degradation of God. In this respect it is instructive to mark in the modern "Religionsphilosophie" of Germany, how the inevitable sequence of logical thought has one by one stripped the Absolute Spirit of the attributes of Personality, Self-consciousness, Consciousness.* But if we deny these attributes of God, what remains to constitute the essence of spirit? It becomes a mere name for the potentiality of spiritual life in the universe. If there is any truth in the theory of thought and its relation to objectivity advanced in the preceding pages, the antithesis of subject and object, and, therefore, consciousness and self-consciousness are all determinations which are of the very essence of Spirit, human or Divine. But if the Divine consciousness has a world of objects over against it, unless we regard matter as co-equal with God—and then the relation of God's consciousness to material things would either be accidental or presuppose a providence older than God,—God must be the first cause of the world. But this relation, the creation by God of a world standing in objective antithesis to His thought and consciousness, is obviously one which no unity or idenity of the human consciousness with the Divine can in itself explain, though it may explain the possibility

* *See* Biedermann's *Christliche Dogmatik*—Pfleiderer's *Religionsphilosophie*—v. Hartmann's *Philosophie des Unbewussten* and *Die Religion des Geistes*. The last of these eminent thinkers it is who approaches nearest to divesting the absolute spirit of consciousness. Nevertheless, he assigns, perhaps inconsistently, "superconsciousness" to "the Unconscious."

of our knowledge of the relation. We seem, therefore, to be thrown back upon the alternative, of seeking to infer from the phenomena of experience, from the existence and constitution of the world, the existence and nature of God.

The attitude of thought which we are now about to consider is essentially different from the foregoing. The idea or consciousness of God instead of being considered as the presupposition and condition of the possibility of finite experience, is rather regarded as the final outcome and product of that experience, the last conclusion deducible from the world of phenomena. Instead, therefore, of the idea of God being the condition of the possibility of experience, experience is the condition of it. It is from our experience of the world that the idea of God is derived. The idea or state of consciousness involved is not viewed as in itself identical with its object, but is regarded as an effect, and perhaps even a remote effect, of that which is its object. It is true that even apart from any possible unity of the human consciousness and the Divine, it is possible to consider the idea of God as immediately determined in us by its Divine object, and not as indirectly produced through the mediation of the world of phenomena, and in this case the relation is one of intuition. But this mode of explaining the knowledge of God, taken by itself, is not only beset with the difficulties which attach to any attempt at distinguishing what in a given mental state is matter of intuition, and what is matter of inference, but is also exposed to certain peculiar objections. In the first place, if we have an immediate or intuitive knowledge of God, the relation of this intuition to the finite world and to the rest of our knowledge remains unexplained.

In the next place, in every other case of intuitive knowledge the object of the intuition is immediately present to the mind as that through which alone the intuition was rendered possible, but this is precisely what is absent from any supposed intuition of God. Nevertheless, there is an element of truth in this doctrine of an intuitive knowledge of God. If, in any way, we can attain to a knowledge of the Divine existence, there must be an element in this knowledge which is intuitive. We have already seen that it lies in the very nature of thought to imply an element of objectivity as that through which thought itself is. Thought is always the thought of that through which thought itself is realized and determined, is brought down from the realm of purely ideal existence and embodied in the world of material reality. Now, it is the perpetual effort, the unceasing attempt springing from the very nature of thought, to think this thought-realizing and thought-determining force that constitutes the ground of that imperative intellectual necessity by which we are driven to seek for each event a cause, for every individual existence its sufficient reason, for the process of the universe an ultimate origin and source. The intuitive principle therefore in our knowledge of God really has its significance, not in abstract isolation and separation from the indirect method which infers from the existence of the world, the existence of God, but rather in close combination with it, as, in fact, its moving principle and nerve. It remains that we consider to what conclusion this method of inference leads.

When we contemplate the world, we find that it consists of an infinite multitude of individual finite things, and that the process of the world consists of an innumerable number of events, none of which possesses

in itself its own sufficient reason. But the causal principle compels us to seek for this infinite multiplicity an ultimate source and ground. Now, when we attempt to form a conception of the nature of this ultimate source or principle, by the very act of doing so it has ceased to be ultimate; it has become an individualized object of thought, which itself implies a principle or force beyond it through which the thought was individualized and realized. If, therefore, we are to avoid a regress *in infinitum*, we can only do so by ceasing to think it, or by thinking it as the unknowable principle or force through which the world of intelligible existence is determined and realized. This thought of a power out of thought through which thought itself is realized and specialized, this unknown and unknowable force which is only in the process of ceasing to be what it is and becoming specialized in finite existence, is that to which the logic of the method we are now considering inevitably leads.

But this conception of the ultimate force or ground of reality in the universe as a principle which recedes infinitely behind the world of intelligible or determinate existence into which it passes and in which it is, itself presupposes a faculty of thought which is implicitly or potentially infinite, and a conception of thought which is objective or in the world. If thought is viewed only as finite, as a mere contingent product of the human or animal organization, then the conception of anything whose sole determination is to be beyond or out of thought is perfectly impossible. If thought be not able ideally to transcend itself, then it is impossible for us to know of anything by which it is really transcended. An ideal movement of thought beyond itself, is the necessary

correlative of a real movement of being from out of itself, from the realm of pure potentiality into that of actualized existence. But if this ultimate force or principle of being is thus in the whole range of its manifested actuality within thought, and is only as it passes into actuality, it follows that it is not by itself the ultimate principle, but that the thought through which it is, is equally ultimate.

We have already in the preceding chapter developed the relations of Thought and Being as they present themselves in the forms of finite existence. We have there endeavoured to show that thought is ideally the *prius* of each kind of truth, of each thing in the universe, but yet in such a way that it is itself really conditioned by that which it ideally conditions. May not the same relation be extended to the universe, to all existence, to everything actual and possible? And it is evident that it not only may, but must, for nothing exists or is conceivable except as it stands in definite relation to these correlative universal principles. The well-known metaphysical proofs of God's existence are simply the logical counterparts of the different phases involved in the one eternal omnipresent relation of thought and power, of knowing and being. Each of these arguments represents a side or phase of an organic process of thought, the sides or phases of which are merely detached from each other by the human intellect for the sake of analytic clearness. Being and thought are not combined in God at random, but in that mutual inter-dependence which springs from the nature of thought and being themselves. It is this which transforms the universe and life itself into one great proof of God's existence, multiplying itself into infinite variety of form and detail. The same relation between thought and being as actually existing,

as felt rather than understood, it is, which silently working as well in the mind of the individual as in that of the race, leads man to look up to a higher power, to seek help and comfort in the difficulties and sufferings of life, and expressing itself in a thousandfold variety of form and interest, has produced the historical religions of our race. To trace the synthetic connections, the Proteus-like transformations of this one principle in history and psychology, is the function of the Philosophy of Religion. We have here to examine it in itself, to discover and test the consequences which flow from it, to bring it before the tribunal of Reason.

We here approach one of the oldest questions in philosophy—the relation of the Ideal to the Real. Are the Ideas a world of intelligible beings, self-existent and uncreated? Have they motion, life, and reason? Do they exist separate from the Nous? Is the world of material things to which they are related eternal? Do they exercise creative power of themselves and in their own right? Are they creative and self-creative? Or must a will, a power from elsewhere come and call them by its realizing force out of their eternal rest, out of the everlasting repose of nothing into existence, real and ideal?

The relation between the ideal sphere and the sphere of reality may be conceived after a threefold manner. First, the theory may be held that thought is not only an active self-moving principle capable of creating the object, but that, in fact, it is the sole principle which is, that the object in its innermost essence is itself thought. Thought is then creative and self-creative. The Idea is the truth of Nature and the power in it. The real is conceived as a phase of the Ideal.

Or, secondly, the view may be held that the Idea is, in itself, unmoved and unmoving, that its existence is conditioned by, or at least that its realization in the world is due to a foreign principle, a force or will which either produces it or seizes upon and subdues it to its purpose; that any movement of thought, any living intellectual process is not due to the intrinsic nature and activity of thought; that, on the contrary, thought possesses no movement in itself, and all such movement is due to the living active force or will at work in the brain of the philosopher.

The third theory of the relation between thought and being is, at first sight, more dualistic than either of the foregoing. It presupposes thought and being as equally ultimate principles. The question then essentially turns upon the relation and connection between them. The unifying process may be regarded as produced by the nature or activity of God, who is either conceived as transcending and external to the principles so united, or as immanent in them.

The first of these theories, finds its most eminent modern representative in Hegel. His system is a monism of thought. Against this theory, there is only to be urged the objection which we have endeavoured already to press home, that thought cannot be conceived as creating its own object, or creating itself as object of itself, for the reason, that its very essence is to presuppose its own object as that through which it realizes itself. Thought has only significance, as the thought *of* an object. This relation is of its very essence, and the object *of* which it is the thinking is presupposed by thought, as there before it. Hegel confuses this logical activity, which attaches to the very innermost essence of the cogitative act, with the essence of the object thought of.

so that the movement of the object, and the movement of thought are identified. The logical implication from out of itself, of an activity or force which, if ideally within is really beyond thought, is by him, confounded with that real activity or force itself, and the essence of the object is consequently conceived as *mere* thought. To put to itself the question of its own relation to being, this is what thought is continually doing, in this it consists. Hegel's system is simply the mere enunciation of this universal problem, giving itself out as the solution. But a merely logical implicating can never *become*, however much it may *imply*, a real force. The force in nature is something more than *mere* thought, and the last result of the criticism of thought, is to show that thought is not self-sufficing, that it is just this, to be the want of, the thinking of something more than itself, which something more is still ideally within it, and without which as real, thought could never even ideally differentiate itself, but would shrivel up into the pointless nothing into which every circular intellectual process disappears, a result to which all such conceptions as that of "an acting, in which the act and its object are the same," or "a thinking in which the thinking and the object of the thinking, are the same," inevitably lead.

But if there is error in Hegel, we must also admit that there is even in his error a large measure of truth. The logical Idea is no motionless principle awaiting a foreign force, over whose excitation it has no control. It is living, but with the life of intellect. Beyond its domain, no realm of being exists. Unto it, all power is given. But the forces of being are within the ideal sphere, not in the sense that they are substantially, but in the sense that they are ideally, one with it. Thought *has*, but *is* not the

power of the universe. Reason possesses and controls that through which it is enabled to realize itself.*

The second theory is common, more or less to all materialistic and subjective-idealistic philosophies. In the form in which it has been stated above, the systems of Schopenhauer and Hartmann, may be taken as representing the doctrine. All forms of this theory are wrecked upon the rock, that that out of which thought or the Idea issues, must be unknowable, and for ever inaccessible to the intelligence, since otherwise it could not be the absolute *prius* of thought, but would in turn be conditioned by the latter. Of any such foreign principle or force, call it matter or will, we must be ignorant, and ignorant even of our ignorance. The very possibility of the theory is therewith destroyed. Nor does Hartmann, although he inclines to a more dualistic theory than Schopenhauer escape this abyss. The Will it is which for Hartmann calls forth the idea out of its undeveloped potentiality, and gives to its purely ideal being the emphasis of reality. But the Will, in which precisely the new element, the reality lies, is, in itself, foreign to the Idea, and must therefore remain, however mechanically united to it, for ever outside the latter, and unknown and unknowable by it.† No suspicion of its

* To say that this is to attribute power or force to thought, is true but is no objection to the theory stated. Because thought can realize itself, it does not follow, as Von Hartmann asserts, that there must then be two forces or wills. The will or force which thought has, is just that which operates in nature.

† "Dieser Wille ist, gleichviel ob man den fremden oder den eigenen betrachtet, nicht mehr ein blosses Jenseits des Bewusstseins (wie das unbewusste Denken), sondern, er ist ein Jenseits des *Idealen überhaupt*, des bewussten wie des unbewussten Denkens" (*Philosophie des Unbewussten*, Bd. II., s. 462). The *real* relation of being to thought, or the Will as actualizing the

being, and therefore of the essence of reality could ever cross the threshold of thought. If the Will, therefore, is inexplicable in itself, its relation to the Idea must be equally inexplicable. Its very existence, excitation, ability to realize the Idea and inability to miss it, are all inexplicable facts or rather fictions. Accordingly, Hartmann finds himself here compelled to grasp at the wildest hypotheses, of which one example—the transcendent misery of God—suffices.

The third theory supposes that thought and being are alike ultimate principles, reciprocally conditioning and conditioned by each other, at least as they exist in the composite world of reality. The question is, as to the nature of the correlation, or unifying process, through which they are brought together or refer to each other. And here a possible view may be mentioned, which however, will be quickly seen to be untenable. Thought and being, may be regarded as in themselves absolutely separate spheres, eternally existent apart from each other, and their union in the world of real things, as the work of a world-builder or God. This view, not only contradicts the theory of the objectivity of truth, which represents these two principles as inherently related to, comprehending and wrestling with each other, but presents insuperable difficulties, whether we contemplate it in

Idea, Hartmann represents correctly. (Id. II., 431, 432). The *ideal* relation of thought to being as ideally "over-reaching" their opposition and existing in and through the difference, he entirely neglects, and misses, in consequence, the true bond of unity in diversity, the correlation of the ideal identity and real difference, the integrating and differentiating moments of the process of the universe. With Hartmann's Will compare τὸ ἄπειρον of Plato. On the nature of the latter, see Maguire's *Parmenides*, pp. xxviii-xxxi.

relation to God by whom the unification is effected, or in relation to the world, which is produced by the unifying process; for the relation of two eternal principles, to a third possessed of powers of mixing and manipulating the other two, is an impossible problem for the intellect, and when we turn to the world of individual things, we find that reality is always a compound of matter and idea, of being and thought, a *σύνολον*, and that *mere* being and *mere* thought are impossible and unreal abstractions.

But if the consideration of the theory either in relation to God, or the world, is alike fatal to it, it is so in opposite ways. In relation to God, the two eternal principles, must be degraded to mere creations and products of his will. They are mere creatures produced by a mysterious and incomprehensible Creator. If on the other hand we contemplate the principles of being and thought, not as mere instruments of the inscrutable will of God, fashioned by Himself for His own use, but as they interpenetrate and refer to each other in the world of real existence, we find them here ever inherently related to each other according to a self-acting system of laws, upon which reposes the order of the world. This system of natural forces and intelligible law, determining and realizing each other in mutual correspondence, possessing inherent necessity, seems to rest on its own independent basis, and God seems to sink into a mere name for the immanent unity of the process of the world. The question is, how are we to reconcile these two terms; the transcendent personal Being before whom the world is as nothing, and the vast impersonal existence which realizes itself in the order of the universe.

We here encounter a problem which, as the opposition

of Judaism and Heathenism, of Ebionism and Gnosticism, or again of Deism and Pantheism, pervades the history of religious thought. The one side starting from the Infinite and Incomprehensible robs the finite of its due, the other side starting from the finite and real vainly struggles to find in it the Infinite. The most usual and easiest way of solving the problem is consequently the rejection or suppression of one of its sides. On the one hand the transcendent personal existence of God is surrendered, to make way for the all-pervading world-order, which seems to leave no room for any extra-mundane power; on the other hand, the system of the world is degraded into the mere mechanical contrivance of an almighty Architect. Each of these opposite modes of thought corresponds to actual needs of the religious consciousness. On the one hand, we cannot know God as "Him in whom we live and move and have our being," when he is separated from us by the vast intervening mechanism of nature, when he is relegated to the beginning or the end of things, and is conceived as entering into actual personal relations with man only in isolated acts, in which the order of the world is suspended and broken through. But again an abstract world-order is no possible object of the religious consciousness. We must have a Being to whom we can look with trust and confidence, and hope and love. Only a personal Being, objectively distinct from ourselves, can form the basis of the belief in the Fatherhood of God. Only so can we feel that the Almighty's protecting care is over his children, that the eternal God is our refuge, and beneath us are the everlasting arms.

This opposition at once in its scientific and religious forms may be conceived as an opposition of the elements

or factors which enter into the notion of God, and are conceived as constituting his essence. These are (1) The Absoluteness of his Nature; (2) The manner of his existence as a Personal Spirit.*

So long as God is regarded as a being absolutely distinct from the world, so long must the world maintain, even though created by him, a relatively independent existence over against him, and so long, therefore, must the Deity be limited by this his own creation. The only way, apparently, therefore, to save the absoluteness of God is, to deny the opposition out of which the limitation springs to conceive the activities of law and force in the natural world as essentially one with God. But, on the other hand, when we turn to the second element in the notion of God, his existence as Spirit, and more precisely as Personal Spirit, we find that the opposition of subject and object is of the very essence of spirit, that destroy this antithesis, annihilate the opposition out which the life of thought springs, and consciousness and self-consciousness disappear, mind is dissipated in its object, and spirit evaporates into the mere unconscious potentiality of spiritual being.

The problem before us is to reconcile these apparently contradictory sides of God's nature, to present his being as distinct from that of the world, yet as still not limited by the world, to present Him as a Power and a Consciousness above and beyond the universe, and yet still to retain the knowledge that "He is not far from every one of us."

It results from the previous analysis of thought that it is never without objectivity, nor objectivity without it.

* *Cf. Biedermann's Dogmatik*, s. 557.

The force which manifests itself in, and is the essence of the object, is contitioned and determined by thought, which is itself conditioned and determined by the object so constituted. But a thought, which is the thinking *of* an object, and has the objective world over against it, is no longer unconscious, but personal and conscious. The thought in the world, which is present to the world and to which the world is present, is therefore that of a thinker. The intelligible nature in things which enables them to become objects for intelligence is in them only through an intelligence really distinguished from them. But again thought is conditioned by the things of nature, posits the object of its thinking only in so far as it presupposes them, *i.e.*, is in determining the object conditioned by it. Now, this relation extended to everything actual and possible determines the relation of God to the universe. He is the Thinker whose thinking conditions the universe. He is the Creator through whom the universe which he thinks exists. But since God's thinking is quite as much conditioned by the objects of his thought as the objects are by the Divine thinking, it follows that God's thinking never exists apart from his creative activity, nor his creative activity apart from his thinking. Between these two extremes lies the world of experience.

But although God's knowing and acting, thinking and creating, are never without, but on the contrary, require and imply each other, they are nevertheless not the same thing, but stand rather in direct antithesis to each other. The opposite theory which he shares in common with the whole idealistic school is well stated by Hartmann. Arguing against the view that the Divine omniscience and wisdom are conscious, he says, "God's idea of the

world is one with the real positing of the world. His world-knowing is his world-creating. Had God besides the original creative world-idea, in addition, a second knowledge of the world, then this second knowledge of the world would be creatively realized by his omnipotence, that is, there would then exist two worlds instead of one. There exists no ground for the assumption that besides the productive ideal archetype of the world, there is also present in God a receptive ideal ectype of the world, that besides that idea of the world whose projection is determined, a second idea should arise in God as reflex of the projection which has been accomplished by the will. The reflex of the actual idea would always come a moment of time later than the archetype which had been projected forth into the world, and would, therefore, come into collision and be confused with the changed content of the idea of the following moment. Should, however, anyone deny the existence of such a temporal interval in the case of the assumed reflex (although the change in time of the absolute Idea renders this inadmissible), and maintain that both in regard to content and time, the reflected ectype of each state of the world coincides with its productive archetype, still, in such, a case, the inadmissible presupposition would always be made, that from the standpoint of God, the inner multiplicity posited by his will of his Idea represents something independent standing over against him, something which is not in him, but exists out of him, upon which the activity which goes forth centrifugally from him must break itself, and be bent round in a centripetal direction. However, this may be, at any rate this assumption of a receptive reflective copy and ectype of the world in God, would not in the least contribute to the

explanation of the process of the world, since it would only be the result and not the ground of the state of the world, and as regards content would add nothing to the independently existing original. Such an assumption therefore accomplishes nothing in the way of explanation and is therefore an unjustifiable hypothesis, altogether apart from the fact that it is involved in contradictions and difficulties." (*Die Religion des Geistes*, s. 145, 146.)

The fundamental error in this passage consists in the identification of God's thinking with his creative activity, in the assertion that "his world-knowing is his world-creating." God's thought is not related in any essentially different way, to sensuous existence, to the material world-process from that in which human thought is related to its object.* Each is in its way *à priori*. Each is also *à posteriori*. When Hartmann contemplates God's knowing of the world as its productive archetype, then this knowing as that through which the object is, but which is itself not dependent on the object, is a very peculiar knowing, it is a knowing without anything to know. Such a knowing is in fact no knowing but a sort of spiritual material, out of which the object is manufactured by the aid of the will. But when this false materialistic conception of an archetypal knowing which prescribes to the object its

* This error appears very clearly in Biedermann. "Aus diesem diametral entgegengesetzten Verhältniss des absoluten und des endlichen Geistes zum materiellen Weltprocess. . ." "Daher kann man im strengen Sinn innerhalb des allgemeinen Begriffs Geist unterscheiden und einander gegenüberstellen endlichen und absoluten Geist, nicht bloss in unbestimmter Steigerung des erstern zum letztern, sondern in genau bestimmten Gegensatz der auf dem diametral entgegengesetzten Verhältniss beider zum sinnlichen Dasein beruht." (*Dogmatik*, s. 635-642.)

nature and essence, because it is that out of which the object is made, is given up, the contradictions arising from the supposed collision of an ectypal and archetypal knowing in God disappear. His ectypal and archetypal knowing do coincide. As the thinker whose thinking is the ideal condition of the objects, God's knowing is archetypal, but in that his thinking is *knowing*, which exists only through having objects to know, it is in the very same relation ectypal, presupposes the realization of itself as distinct from itself, presupposes, therefore, the created world and God's creative activity as already manifested therein. In like manner God's creative activity is only through its ceasing to be what it is and becoming the object of the thoughts which it realizes. God's thinking and creating are, only in the process of setting over against themselves that through which they themselves are. The moment the thought of God is realized by his act, or his act becomes the object of his thought, they have ceased to be God's, and have become that through which they themselves are, viz., the finite world. This relation of God to the universe we will immediately examine. It is necessary, first, to see what determinations result from the abstract relation of the attributes to each other.

As mutually implicative as well in themselves as in their relation to the process of the world, it is evident that in God neither thought nor power has precedence the one of the other. But just in this the freedom of God consists, a freedom, however, which is absolute. Power under the control of consciousness is will, and in the fact that his thought eternally precedes all exercise of his creative activity his freedom consists. He does not act in ignorance driven along by the blindness of

necessity or fate. But if this were all, his freedom would be only human freedom, which is often but caprice. But in God there is no need to reflect, no play of fancy. He foresees all things, and that which he foresees has already had existence allotted to it through his creative act. He thus acts from all eternity, and his freedom is one with absolute necessity. "Necessity and chance approach not me, and what I will is fate." "Nothing," says Bishop Butler, "which is the possible object of knowledge, whether past, present, or future, can be probable to an infinite Intelligence since it cannot but be discerned absolutely as it is in itself, certainly true or certainly false." The fact that God knows how he will act, that he has acted from eternity secures the absoluteness of his creative activity, but the fact that he acts with consciousness, that his creating is conditioned by his thought, secures the freedom of his acting.

From the two determinations of the divine nature, omniscience and omnipotence already given, the third follows which they not merely involve, but by which they are also conditioned, viz., Goodness. This attribute has significance in reference to a presupposed end, which in regard to God must be the "highest good." It implies, therefore, omniscience for the knowledge of this end as the highest conceivable, both in itself and in reference to all other things, and omnipotence, as the ability to bring it to pass. But although these attributes are thus indispensable conditions of the third, it is still not enough that God should know wherein the highest good consists and possess the power of bringing it into reality, it is also necessary that he should will or desire to do so. If he is to be termed good, he must act up to the obligation of

accomplishing ends befitting omnipotent and omniscient powers. But precisely in this there seems to lie a twofold limitation of God's omniscience and omnipotence. First, the end to which his activity is directed is conceived as an ideal, not determined by his thought or omnipotence, but by which, on the contrary, his knowledge and will are determined. The relation between an independent, self-existing ideal and God's omniscience can only be explained by the absolute passivity of his thought and its complete determination by the ideal, which must then be conceived as coming from an *unknown* source and prescribed by a *superior* power. If, further, in order to explain the defects which are empirically recognized in the order of the world, the ideal is conceived as not absolutely perfect, but as simply the best of all possible worlds, we make still more clear the limitation placed upon the thought and power of God, by making manifest in the very constitution of the ideal, its subjection to blind conditions. Nor is it any escape from these objections to assert that it is the nature of God to realize the ideal, because this not merely represents God as passively affected, but also places in him a nature or passive tendency blindly imposed upon his being. "Even a Creator," says Sir W. Hamilton, "intelligent and good and powerful would be no God were he dependent for his intelligence and goodness and power on any higher principle." Secondly, God is represented as limited, not only in regard to the nature of the end or ideal, but also in regard to the ethical obligation he is under to realize the end or highest good, and to maintain the moral laws which it involves. He is represented not as good *per se*, but only as conditionally good. But these conditions, which God has not given to himself but to which he is subject, can only be conceived

as given by a superior principle, which must, therefore, lie beyond his knowledge and power. The attribute of goodness seems, therefore, completely to contradict those of omnipotence and omniscience. But these contradictions arise only from a one-sided apprehension of the problem. They are unavoidable if the Divine thought and power are conceived as only passively related to the Highest Good and to the principles of moral obligation, as determined by and not as in turn determining them. But just as we were compelled to conceive God's omnipotence and omniscience as mutually conditioning each other, so we must here conceive God's thought and will as conditioning the Good by which they are conditioned. For there cannot exist an ideal or standard of good outside of his thought and power, although this very thought and power even in determining this ideal end and moral standard are themselves determined by that whose nature and existence they determine. The controversy, therefore, as to whether morality has its foundation in the nature or will of God, *i.e.*, whether it is good because God wills it, or God wills it because it is good, is to be decided by accepting both statements at once. The good exists only through his will, but at the same time his will exists only through the good whose nature and being it determines. God is good, therefore, as the final cause and creator of the good. He not only creates things because they are good, but they are good because he creates them; and this good is that which realizes itself in all other finite things which are good and causes them to be so. He is good because there cannot lie outside of his infinite existence and will any ideal or standard of good to which he must conform himself. He in creating things creates therewith the standard

real and ideal by which they are to be judged, and through relation to which his own thinking and will are determined. These three attributes—Omniscience, Omnipotence, Goodness—must be conceived as existing in and through each other, as successively conditioning and conditioned, God as creating the good, and His creative activity as being itself determined by the good which it creates. Such is the absolute nature of God.

The relation between God as so conceived and the world avoids the opposite errors at once of Pantheism and Deism. The personality of God is retained without limiting his absoluteness. The attributes of thought and power do not exist except as they come in contact with each other, but this contact takes place not directly, but through the medium of a third object, the world of finite existence. Each attribute, therefore, by means of the other puts forth from itself, and infinitely passes into, that from which it distinguishes itself. In the passage quoted from Hartmann, he says that the view here presented of the relation of the Divine thought to the world would involve "the inadmissible presupposition that from the standpoint of God, the inner multiplicity posited by his will, of his Idea, represents something independent standing over against him, something which is not in him, but exists out of him." Most certainly; but wherefore "inadmissible"? We have shown that the element of objectivity exists in all thinking, above all in that of God; that thought involves a principle through which the inner multiplicity of the divine idea is posited and opposed to the divine consciousness in the world, so that God's thought is at once separate from the world and yet present in the world, ideally identical and really distinct from the universe. The very nature of

thought is to involve its own diremption, to presuppose its own unconscious and materialized existence in the things of Nature of which, nevertheless, its conscious existence is the supreme ideal condition.

When we pass from God's cognitive or cogitative relation to the world, to his creative activity as manifested in and through the world, we find that the relation is precisely similar. Both these relations are correlative. His thinking and creating imply each other. But in each case the world is relatively self-existent over against him. God creates the world as an independent existence which yet in its independence is dependent upon him. His creative activity and omniscience must then be contemplated from two points of view; first, as an unchanging act in God himself above the conditions of time; secondly, as eternally realizing itself in the creation of the world with and in time. The world which is so created by God, created in relative opposition to his own creative activity, and through the instrumentality of which his *creatio mediata* is effected, is yet no limitation of God's power, for it still continues to exist only through the creative activity, by which in the beginning it was called into being. This is the truth of the doctrine of the *creatio continua* and the *concursus divinus*. If the independent existence of the world is conceived as something due once for all to the act of creation, and if this act is not conceived as continuing itself through the entire process of the world's development, then there will be therein at once a limitation of the original act by which God created the world, the *creatio immediata*, and God's preservation and government of the world must be conceived as subject to the limitations which the elements and forces through which the *creatio mediata*

takes place impose. An act of creation or will, which stops short and does not continue itself into all the consequences which flow from it, cannot be contemplated as eternally existent above the conditions of time in God; and a providence or government of the world which does not work from eternity but merely intervenes to guide forces already in existence, must either be limited by these, or else, in so far as it operates, these forces must be annulled; or, in so far as these forces operate, they must lie beyond the control of providence. God's preservation and government of the world does not therefore exist along with, but immediately in and through the forces of Nature.

In this way we are able to recognize the *immediate* activity and presence of God throughout Nature without falling into a Spinozistic or Pantheistic identification of God with Nature. It is common in the present day to adopt Hegel's criticism, and to say that Spinoza's system is not Atheism, but Acosmism. This sounds like an excuse for Spinoza. But it certainly does not mend matters. It was bad enough that his substance should have swallowed up God, that it must needs swallow up the world also. The true criticism is that God does indeed sustain the world, but it is by making it sustain itself. The error in Spinoza's system does not lie in apprehending God under the notion of substance. When we conceive God as cause of the world, we may equally err if we conceive him as merely one in the series of finite causes. God causes the world but in the very act, withdraws himself from the series of finite causes which exist through his act.

This view of the relation of God to the world meets all the objections which have been raised against the doctrine

of the Personality of God, on the ground that it contradicts his absoluteness.* When it is urged that the eternity and omnipresence, the omniscience, and omnipotence, the wisdom and holiness of God when actually thought as absolute, contradict the personality of God and the opposition to the external and finite which it involves, the answer is, that both sides must be held fast—God's eternity and omnipresence, not as excluding all opposition to the changing and the external, but as existing in and through the opposition—God's omniscience and omnipotence, not as rejecting, or inconsistent with, but as manifesting themselves through the mediation of finite existence—his wisdom, holiness and goodness, not as destroying the notion of the intrinsically good, but as revealing themselves therein.

The relation of God to the world is that of creation from eternity. Yet the world itself must be conceived as finite, because only as finite can it be distinguished from God's creative activity, and only through the distinction does his creative activity itself exist. We must, therefore, think it as absolutely beginning to exist, and yet think this beginning as infinitely receding in thought and reality. Through the gate of eternity has God's creative word gone forth. This creation from eternity may be contemplated from two points of view. Starting from God, we may attempt to conceive the transition to the world of finite existence; or, starting from the finite world we may attempt to conceive its ultimate origin in God. In the latter case, every attempt to conceive the First Cause ends in making that cause itself one of the series of causes which it is to explain. Nature refers itself to God only by making God a part of

* Cf. *Biedermann's Dogmatik*, s. 557-577.

nature, and thought recognizes the first cause only in the fact that it eternally escapes its grasp. The first point of view also leads to a similar result. God's eternal existence cannot be conceived as in time before the creation of the world. It is necessary, therefore, to think God as creating the world simultaneously with time—*creatio immediata cum tempore*—but the beginning of time recedes infinitely in time.

This relation, whether contemplated from the finite or infinite side, becomes clear when we reflect on the abstract relations of thought and power. God's thinking exists through its own realization in the world. But that through which it is realized is itself the object of thought. This alternation of ideal and real *prius* extends itself to an infinite progression, through which infinite progression the universe exists. His will and thought, therefore, are eternal only, as they from eternity through their mutual realization of each other, have passed into the process of the universe. In God, therefore, the act and the power to act are one. He not only can think and create whatever he will, but he actually thinks and creates whatever he can. But this limitation which seems to be imposed on him by the exhaustion of his act in its product, arises not from the latter in its separation from God, but as the expression of God's will. In the former aspect his will is *voluntas libera*, in the latter, *voluntas necessaria*.

The relation, however, in which God stands to the universe cannot be completely understood apart from the doctrine which ultimately forms the basis of the possibility of mediating between the opposite extremes of Deism and Pantheism, of combining the absolute and personal elements in the notion of God, of reconciling

the finite with the infinite—the doctrine of the Trinity. The essential attributes of God are Omniscience, Omnipotence and Goodness. They are not separable from each other. They are neither *realiter*, nor merely *nominaliter*, but *formaliter* different. Their relation to each other as successively conditioning, and conditioned, gives the speculative foundation of the doctrine of the Trinity. Each attribute as conditioning and eternally aloof from determination in reference to the world, belongs to the primal fount of being in the Godhead, in the language of the Church, God the Father—*Fons et principium sacræ Trinitatis.* As conditioned by the other attributes and passing into its conditioned and manifested reality, it is the attribute of God the Son. As the synthesis of these two, as manifesting and realizing the condition in the conditioned, each attribute belongs to the third person in the Trinity, or the Holy Ghost. But the condition and the conditioned are so related to each other that the one passes wholly over into the other, and the one is not without the other. The whole is in each, and each is a moment in the whole. In this Trinity, therefore, "none is afore or after other, none is greater or less than another."

To determine this more exactly. Thought and power or force stand over against each other as the infinite Consciousness and Power which from eternity determines and realizes itself, and is through its realization. This Being in whom consciousness and being have infinitely comprehended each other, which, itself unmoved, is, through the relation of its attributes to each other, the source of all life and movement is God the Father. But the attributes of God the Father comprehend each other only as they from eternity enter into an infinite process

of mutual realization. The quiescent being of God in thus from eternity passing into an infinite process of self-realization, which is ever becoming, and yet *sub specie æternitatis* already is, constitutes the person of the Son. The product of this process into which it or the Son passes, and yet from which in his unity with the Father he is distinct, is the finite world. In the latter power, or activity, has attained expression. Thought does not in it determine, but is determined as an object, in which active force has realized itself. As attribute of the Son, thought is the thinking of the force by which it is determined, determines itself as determined by an external power, and thus passes out of itself as thinking activity into the object which it thinks. By relation to this object, against which it still maintains itself, its "soundless sounding" is interrupted and its pure unity broken. It is thus the ideal link between the thinker and his object. Corresponding to this, power or force, as attribute of the Son, is related to thought no longer as its object, but as that beyond thinking through which the object is realized. Power has not yet attained realization, but passes into it; and its passing into realization is one with the ideal process of thought making it its object, and in doing so determining it. Thought's act in thinking this force or external power is from another side the act of the force itself in realizing thought. This is the force in all forces; the activity which is not yet, but is ever becoming, the activity into which the infinite power to act passes from eternity, and which is being perpetually realized in and through the process of the world. It is the correlative of and inseparably one with the thought which has from eternity through thinking this activity determined it and itself. Finally,

in that the First Person in determining the Second is determined by the Second Person, the Divine attributes belong to the Holy Ghost, who may therefore be conceived as proceeding from the Father and the Son. The same attributes thus belong to all three Persons in such a way that each in himself includes the others, and yet surrenders himself and enters as a moment into their being.

The conception of God here presented is that which satisfies the needs at once of the scientific and religious consciousness. God the Father is God conceived as transcendent, as existing in light unapproachable. God the Son is God as immanent in the world, revealing the Spirit of the Eternal in the moral and physical order of the universe. This conception of God is especially the condition of the existence of a science of Ethics, for only in this way can the eternal and immutable principles of Morality be prevented from coming into collision with the omnipotent will and purposes of God, so that neither is the absolute power of God infringed, nor his moral character destroyed. In this way, too, are God's potential and manifested omnipotence reconciled—God as the infinite power to do all things and as the sum of all existing forces. As removing from the Divine Nature all these seeming contradictions which the finitude of our minds and the perplexities of experience create, Philosophy is invested with an eternal priesthood, eternal with the eternity of Truth.

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